From classical to medieval?Later scholars have even tried to extend the notion of kenmon rule to the late sixteenth century,
claiming that some of the traditional elites continued to wield political and military power.^45
Such studies, however, ignore the central importance of judicial privileges, which were chal-
lenged by the Ashikaga shogunate, and the ideological foundation of the interdependence of the
Buddhist and Imperial Law, which experienced a decline as well.
Others, such as Nagahara, pointed out that Kuroda was correct in noting the continuities
between the late Heian and Kamakura eras, but also criticized him for exaggerating the similar-
ities between the Kamakura and Ashikaga shogunates. The former sustained the old Kyoto-
centered system by containing the warrior class, while the latter took over most functions of the
state, including appointments to religious institutions.^46
Nagahara’s critique has merit. There is undoubtedly a strong connection between the kenmon and
the shōen, but private estates emerged prior to the kenmon, and so the shōen would seem to provide a
precondition for the emergence of elites. Most importantly, if we are to see kenmon rule as being
characterized by a division of rights and responsibilities, then the late fourteenth century would be a
much more significant transition than any other period. Early leaders of the newly established Ashik-
aga shogunate deliberatively attempted to take over all aspects of rulership. For instance, they all but
eliminated the many judicial rights held by the kenmon by taxing formerly immune areas, and by the
time of the third shogun, Yoshimitsu (1358–1408; shogun 1368–1394), Kōfukuji was taken out of
the hands of the Fujiwara in what would only have been seen as unthinkable just a century earlier. In
addition, Yoshimitsu placed special envoys within Enryakuji in an attempt to extend the shogunate’s
control within the mightiest of the religious kenmon.^47
In the end, it is problematic to see a continuation of a kenmon system beyond the turn of the
fifteenth century, even if some temples continued to exert influence into the late sixteenth. By
the same token, however, it is noteworthy that those temples that were the most powerful by
that point included only one of the old elite temples (Enryakuji), while the others had lost much
of their influence. In their stead, new, military strongholds had emerged, such as Negoroji,
Kōyasan, and Honganji.
Over the past couple of decades, the kenmon theory has remained an important starting point
for a generation of scholars, not all of whom can be covered in this short chapter, but one line of
questions it has generated may serve as an illustration of its profound impact. Specifically, Kuroda’s
emphasis on the role played by the kenmon household organizations inspired many scholars to
take a closer look at how they actually functioned. Satō Kenji (b. 1967), for example, examined
the emergence of the Fujiwara household organization (kasei soshiki), and found that it came
about around the time of the influential chieftain Fujiwara no Tadahira (880–949) in the early
tenth century. In particular, he points to two important units within the court: the Kangakuin
(initially set up as the imperial university dormitory) and the Seyakuin (a medical establishment
for the poor and sick), which were put under the control of the Fujiwara in the late ninth century.
One strong justification for this emphasis on Tadahira’s role is evidenced when the Shingon
center Tōji complained against alleged intrusions into its property in the Ōyama Estate in 920.
Tōji filed its petition directly with Tadahira, instead of using the official and established channel
through the Council of State. Interestingly, Satō also claims that temples such as Enryakuji trans-
formed themselves into kenmon by emphasizing their service to the state, while the Fujiwara
accomplished that transformation by removing themselves from the established state structure.
In this way, he shows that while the result may have been similar, the roads to becoming an elite
institution with public responsibilities and vast private assets varied between each bloc. By
emphasizing the importance of the tenth century, Satō’s conclusion contrasts with Kuroda’s
insofar that he argues that the kenmon- ification of the regental line of the Fujiwara marks the
beginning of the age of the kenmon and thus also the medieval age.^48