Medieval warriors and warfareprimary objective of warfare became the capture or defense of territory. Faced with a new stra-
tegic imperative to capture or defend specific geographic areas (and armed with a growing ability
to drill and discipline troops and therefore to field versatile, articulated armies), Japanese com-
manders reshaped their tactics around companies of archers—and later gunners—on foot, uti-
lized to break enemy formations, which could then be chased from the field by spearmen.^51
The road forward
This chapter has introduced the main directions and trends in research concerning the origins of
the bushi, the beginnings of warrior rule, and the conduct of warfare. In recent decades, historians
have overturned a number of the constituent parts of what was once the received wisdom con-
cerning warriors and warfare in medieval Japan. In particular, they have ceased to view the
appearance of warriors as a function of economic developments and the evolution of the classical
state’s landholding system, and are instead searching for explanations that emphasize the bushi’s
essential function as military specialists. And they have turned from simplistic themes like a sup-
posed shift from combat centered on mounted archery to hand- to-hand combat with bladed
weapons, or from one- on-one duels between horsemen to fighting between companies of infan-
try, and are now instead focusing on (changes in) the integration of cavalry and foot soldiers, and
the evolving face of war as whole. That is, rather than analyzing single pieces of battles, they are
now looking at the evolution of warfare and the composition of armies in the context of broad
political and social change.
Nevertheless, the substantive re- evaluation of medieval warfare and military forces that began
in the 1990s remains a work in progress. Historians working on these questions have yet to
achieve a new consensus on many key points. There are also numerous topics that cry out for
attention, if we are to achieve a comprehensive understanding of medieval warfare.
Medieval warlords must, for example, have faced numerous political and administrative prob-
lems in the wake of victorious campaigns, including the means by which they reconstructed battle
sites in the aftermath of fighting, the ways in which they provided for wounded survivors and the
families of those killed, the measures they took to absolve enemy forces and cut off the cycle of
revenge and retaliation, and other similar political problems. Military training—the means by
which medieval combatants learned to fight—remains another important, yet mostly unexplored
subject. Henceforth, historians also need to look more carefully at the activities of non- combatant,
logistical- support troops conscripted from the farming population for tasks such as transport of
provisions and the building and razing of fortifications. Naval warfare remains another under-
explored topic.^52 And, most importantly, there is a need for more thorough amalgamation and
integration of discoveries concerning nuts and bolts subjects like weapons technology, strategy and
tactics, and the face of battle with assessments of broader political and socio- economic evolution.
Notes
1 Uwayokote Masataka, “Heian chūki no keisatsu seido.”
2 Hara Katsurō, Nihon chūsei shi (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1906; rpt. 1969). Hara’s ideas were echoed by
Asakawa Kan’ichi, who was publishing at nearly the same time, albeit in English. See “The Origin of
Feudal Land Tenure in Japan” originally published in 1914; or “The Founding of the Kamakura Shogu-
nate by Minamoto- no-Yoritomo” (1933).
3 Ishimoda Shō, Chūseiteki sekai no keisei, originally published in 1946; Kodai makki no seiji katei oyobi seiji
keitai, originally published in 1950.
4 Important examples of this view of warrior origins include Yasuda Motohisa, Bushi sekai no jomaku, and
Takeuchi Rizō, Bushi no tōjō. For examples in English, see George Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334,