366 Part IV Dispositional Theories
some are transient, others recurring; some are peripheral, others propriate; and
some are tension reducing, others tension maintaining. Motives that appear to
be different really are different, not only in form but also in substance.- “It will ascribe dynamic force to cognitive processes—e.g., to planning and
intention” (Allport, 1961, p. 222). Allport argued that most people are busy
living their lives into the future, but that many psychological theories are “busy
tracing these lives backward into the past. And while it seems to each of us
that we are spontaneously active, many psychologists are telling us that we are
only reactive” (p. 206). Although intention is involved in all motivation, this
third requirement refers more generally to long-range intention. A young
woman declines an offer to see a movie because she prefers to study anatomy.
This preference is consistent with her purpose of making good grades at college
and relates to her plans of being admitted to medical school, which is necessary
in order for her to fulfill her intention of being a doctor. The lives of healthy
adults are future oriented, involving preferences, purposes, plans, and intentions.
These processes, of course, are not always completely rational, as when people
allow their anger to dominate their plans and intentions. - An adequate theory of motivation is one that “will allow for the concrete
uniqueness of motives” (Allport, 1961, p. 225). A concrete unique motive
is different from an abstract generalized one, the latter being based on a
preexistent theory rather than the actual motivation of a real person.
An example of a concrete unique motive is Derrick, who is interested in
improving his bowling game. His motive is concrete, and his manner of
seeking improvement is unique to him. Some theories of motivation may
ascribe Derrick’s behavior to an aggressive need, others to an inhibited
sexual drive, and still others to a secondary drive learned on the basis of a
primary drive. Allport would simply say that Derrick wants to improve his
bowling game because he wants to improve his bowling game. This is
Derrick’s unique, concrete, and functionally autonomous motive.
In summary, a functionally autonomous motive is contemporary and self-
sustaining; it grows out of an earlier motive but is functionally independent of it. Allport
(1961) defined functional autonomy as “any acquired system of motivation in which the
tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the
acquired system developed” (p. 229). In other words, what begins as one motive may
grow into a new one that is historically continuous with the original but functionally
autonomous from it. For example, a person may originally plant a garden to satisfy a
hunger drive but eventually become interested in gardening for its own sake.
Perseverative Functional Autonomy
The more elementary of the two levels of functional autonomy is perseverative
functional autonomy. Allport borrowed this term from the word “perseveration,”
which is the tendency of an impression to leave an influence on subsequent expe-
rience. Perseverative functional autonomy is found in animals as well as humans
and is based on simple neurological principles. An example of perseverative func-
tional autonomy is a rat that has learned to run a maze in order to be fed but then
continues to run the maze even after it has become satiated. Why does it continue
to run? Allport would say that the rat runs the maze just for the fun of it.