the Jewish state. This was soon followed by others. As a result, the UN
eff orts to secure trusteeship became meaningless, and the Special Ses-
sion abruptly ended on May 15.
Thus India’s election to the UNSCOP provided the fi rst opportunity for
its leadership to articulate the position of the nationalists regarding the
Palestine question in the international arena. The pro- Arab position ad-
opted by the Congress Party during the freedom struggle gained substance
at the United Nations. Even though its nominee initially favored the Arab
demand for a unitary Palestine, Nehru advised him to modify this stand
and recommended a “middle path.” If the majority members of the UN-
SCOP viewed partition as a compromise between the extremist demands
of Arabs and Jews, Nehru saw a federal Palestine as a compromise be-
tween partition and a unitary Palestine. While providing greater civic and
social rights, it sought to preserve the Arab character of Palestine.
The contrast between the partition and federal plans is stark. The for-
mer sought po liti cal separation and economic cooperation between the
Arab and Jewish communities; the Indian plan aspired to achieve coop-
eration and accommodation between the warring communities. While
one granted po liti cal rights and sovereignty to both nations, the other
bestowed religious and civil rights upon the minorities. The former was
swayed by the historic suff ering of the Jewish people; the latter was pre-
occupied with the historic rights of native inhabitants. Both the partition
plan and the federal plan have their own shares of limitations and short-
comings. The partition plan succeeded mainly because it enjoyed the sup-
port and endorsement of at least one of the contending parties. India’s
federal plan failed because even the Arabs discarded it. Rejected by both
parties, India’s plan was never discussed at the United Nations and was
quietly buried by the international community.
the partition of palestine 107