recognition without relations 121under the military control of Egypt, and the APG had very little freedom
of movement— let alone sovereignty— in that tiny piece of land. The
much larger eastern Palestine (or later on, the West Bank) came under
the control of King Abdullah of Transjordan (later Jordan), who had no
intention of relinquishing control. Granting sovereignty to the mufti- led
APG was out of question. Refl ecting this reality, India felt that the claim
of the APG “for recognition are no stronger than that of the Government
of South Korea posing as the national government of all Korea. Realistic
approach would suggest our ignoring this claim.”^83
Third, the APG soon became a major po liti cal embarrassment for the
Arab League, as some of its members sought to expel Transjordan, one of
the founding members, over its occupation of the West Bank. The Jeri-
cho Conference of December 1948 accentuated internal divisions among
the Palestinians and the unpopularity of the mufti- led government. The
APG did not survive, and before long key cabinet members left the mufti
and joined hands with King Abdullah. Thus a hasty recognition of the
APG would have placed New Delhi at loggerheads with Amman. And fi -
nally, there was a Pakistani dimension. Despite past Indian support, the
Palestinian leadership, especially the mufti, drew closer to Pakistan and
became its staunch supporter over the Kashmir dispute.^84 Ever since his
February 1951 visit to Karachi to preside over the World Muslim Confer-
ence, the mufti had been frequenting Pakistan.^85 If one adds the tradi-
tional wait- and- see position adopted by India, nonrecognition of the APG
was both logical and inevitable.
If India was so diligent and cautious toward recognizing Israel and not
recognizing the APG, how does one explain its quick recognition of the
state of Palestine, proclaimed on November 15, 1988? Indian recognition
came despite the entity lacking the most fundamental characteristic of
statehood: control over territory. This lack of sovereignty did not inhibit
India or many other Third World countries from recognizing the Pales-
tinian state and treating it as a sovereign entity. This was long before
Yasser Arafat returned to the Gaza Strip in 1994 to establish the Palestin-
ian National Authority (PNA). Given the extent of Israeli control, even the
PNA could not be seen as a sovereign entity. But Indian recognition of
the state of Palestine in 1988 was merely a po liti cal gesture that should be
placed within the context of its pro- Palestinian policy.
Notwithstanding delays and ambiguities, its recognition of the Jewish
state was a major development in India’s Middle East policy. This came
against the backdrop of traditional Indian sympathy for the Arabs, its