124 recognition without relationsnew missions or concurrent accreditations. In early 1950, the ministry
observed: “In view of the imperative need for all possible economies on
expenditure, the proposal for establishing consular repre sen ta tion at
Mehshed and Koramshahr [Iran], Basra [Iraq], Bahrain and Muscat
[Oman] have been kept in abeyance.”^96 Another report suggested that
“as a mea sure of economy, the Heads of Mission in certain countries
were concurrently accredited.”^97 As a result, even in the mid- 1950s, India’s
ambassador in Cairo was concurrently accredited to Jordan, Lebanon,
and Syria.^98 Taking cognizance of this trend, at one time Israel even sug-
gested the concurrent accreditation to Israel of India’s ambassador to
Turkey.^99
Some of Nehru’s statements vindicate the nonpo liti cal thinking tak-
ing place during this phase. A couple of months after recognition, he
ruled out diplomatic exchanges with Israel due to “fi nancial and other
reasons” and added that his government was “anxious to avoid additional
commitments abroad at present.”^100 Two years later, India declared:
“Owing mainly to the existing fi nancial stringency it has not been found
possible to establish missions in these countries [Israel, Saudi Arabia,
and Yemen] so far.”^101 While it opened embassies and consular offi ces in
other parts of the Middle East, Israel remained an exception. As time
went by, it became obvious that the bud getary issue was merely one of
the reasons for the Indian hesitance and not the prime one. Over time,
Nehru’s reference to “other factors” in his December 1950 statement
gained greater importance than before.
A formal and offi cially negative attitude concerning normalization
was noticeable during the Suez Crisis of 1956. By then, three powerful
forces came to infl uence India’s policy toward Israel: (1) anticolonialist
Afro- Asian solidarity, formally consecrated at Bandung in April 1955; (2)
Israel’s increasing identifi cation with the imperial powers, as manifested
by its coordinated aggression against Egypt during the Suez crisis; and
(3) the growing personal friendship between Nehru and the Egyptian
president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Speaking in the Lok Sabha days after
the Israeli invasion of Egypt, Nehru declared that “in view of the existing
passion,” diplomatic exchanges were not possible.^102 A couple of years
later, at a press conference in New Delhi, Nehru maintained: “This atti-
tude [toward Israel] was adopted after a careful consideration of the bal-
ance of factors. It is not a matter of high principles, but it is based on how
we could best serve and be helpful in the area.... After careful thought,
we felt that while recognizing Israel as an entity, we need not at this stage