domestic politics 141so overwhelming that even the foreign policy of the BJP had to be explained
within the secular construct. In the words of one scholar:
[Atal Behari] Vajpayee as the Foreign Minister, under the Janata gov-
ernment [1977– 1979] with its Jan Sanghi mix, could not alter the so-
called “pro- Muslim” orientation of India’s [Middle East] policy dur-
ing the Cold War. Similarly, after the end of the Cold War, it was the
Congress government, led by Narasimha Rao, which decided to es-
tablish full diplomatic relations with Israel. Furthermore, the NDA
(National Demo cratic Alliance) co ali tion government, led by a right-
ist party [the BJP] has been intensifying its eff orts to build bridges
with many Islamic nations like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey more
than its pre de ces sors led by the Congress and National Front.He concludes that it is as “erroneous to accuse Nehru and others of being
pro- Muslim as it is to apprehend that the BJP- led NDA would neglect
Muslim countries” in the Middle East.^13 In other words, when it comes to
the Middle East, even the BJP is secular!
If the BJP was able to pursue a secular policy toward the outside world,
why did it fail to internalize this secular ethos? The party and its forerun-
ner, the Jan Sangh, are known more for their anti- Muslim slant than for
any of their other policy platforms. Although not every member of the
BJP can be accused of being anti- Muslim, the party has been unable or
unwilling to rid itself of its antiminority tag. The belated admission of
Muslims within its rank and fi le has not transformed the party into
a centrist force, and the Muslim leaders of the BJP are often decried as
“poster boys” rather than party stalwarts. A more plausible explanation
would be that when it comes to the Middle East, even a Hindu nationalist
party like the BJP could not ignore the domestic dimension.
To claim that India’s Israel policy is exclusively “secular” and that the
domestic Muslim factor has no infl uence would be taking liberty with
logic, common sense, and demo cratic values. Such an argument would be
possible if India were to satisfy three basic conditions: (1) that it does not
have a sizeable Muslim population; (2) that Muslims outside the region
are not interested in Middle Eastern developments; and (3) that India is a
nondemo cratic state oblivious to views of diff erent segments of its popu-
lation. None of these conditions accurately describes India. The available
data indicates that Islam has had a greater infl uence in India’s Middle East
policy than commonly recognized.