domestic politics 149
did not result in normalization, as promised by Nehru. Commenting on
this, Brecher remarked:
The “sudden change of mind” in the spring of 1952 was due to the
forceful intervention of Maulana Azad, intimate friend of Nehru....
Until his death in 1958, the Maulana exerted great infl uence on India’s
Middle East policy.... As a Muslim, Azad was naturally pro- Arab. He
was also fearful of the consequences of diplomatic relations with
Israel on India’s position in the Arab world. An unstated but bitter
rivalry with Pakistan for Arab support on the Kashmir dispute was
then at its height.... Azad [and Nehru] was also concerned about the
possible impact of a welcoming gesture to Israel on India’s large and
insecure Muslim minority. Pakistan would probably have fanned the
fl ames of communal hatred in India by reference to Israel. T his might
have aff ected the loyalty of India’s Muslims and would, in any event,
have been a shock to their already bewildered state of mind following
the Partition riots and mass migration, with the aftermath of distrust
among Hindus. Was an exchange of diplomatic missions with Israel
worth all these risks? Azad fi rmly argued against the proposal. Nehru
may have been convinced— for the case was strong in terms of India’s
“national interests.” At any rate, he yielded to Azad’s advice.^32
Moreover, according to Eytan, Nehru had suggested that the question of
normalization would be referred to the cabinet. Commenting on Nehru’s
role in foreign aff airs, Brecher concluded:
In no other state does one man dominate foreign policy as does
Nehru in India. Indeed, so overwhelming is his infl uence that In-
dia’s policy has come to mean in the minds of people everywhere the
personal policy of Pandit Nehru... he has impressed his personality
and his views with such overpowering eff ect that foreign policy may
properly be termed a private monopoly.... No one in the Congress
or the government, not even Sardar Patel, ever challenged his control
in this sphere.^33
Azad therefore becomes the only minister who could have questioned
Nehru’s proposal for normalization. Since cabinet decisions in India
must be unanimous, it is likely that the issue was not put to vote. Thus,