150 d omestic politicsmore than any other single individual, it was Azad who compelled Nehru
to abandon his promises to Israel on normalization.
Under normal circumstances, Brecher’s assessment could be treated as
his personal views and could even be dismissed as being personally or po-
liti cally motivated. His biography of Nehru, which contained a brief refer-
ence to Azad’s role, was published in 1959. This was shortly after Azad’s
death in 1958, but Nehru was still in offi ce. Hence it is diffi cult to imagine
that the Indian prime minister was not aware of Brecher blaming Azad
for nonrelations. The New States of Asia, which contained a much detailed
assessment of the issue, was fi rst published in 1964, shortly after Nehru’s
death in May of that year. More than a de cade later, Nehru’s other biogra-
pher, S. Gopal, gave credence to Brecher’s assessment. Gopal admitted
that Nehru had informed Israel that there were no major objections to
normalization and that Israel would have to wait for the formation of a
new Indian government after the elections. But then Gopal adds: “Even
then nothing was done. This inaction has been attributed to the infl uence
of Azad.”^34 The source was not any cabinet or other offi cial papers which
were available to him; Gopal consulted The New States of Asia.
Not surprisingly, others have not commented upon Azad’s role in de-
laying the normalization of diplomatic relations. At one level, it was dif-
fi cult to challenge Brecher’s assessment, especially after Gopal endorsed
his claims. On the other hand, to concur with the assessment that Azad
sabotaged normalization would undermine the “secular” arguments ex-
plaining India’s Israel policy. The objections supposed to have been
raised by Azad were not new and were valid when the Indian prime min-
ister promised normalization to Eytan. They were probably given addi-
tional importance by Azad, which led to the deferment. Given the results,
even those who argue about Azad’s role and infl uence upon Nehru’s
Middle East policy carefully avoid discussing Brecher’s assessment. This
deafening silence ironically becomes the loudest confi rmation available
in India regarding Azad’s role. There are also other indications.
Grudging Admissions
In July 1948, within weeks of the formation of Israel, an Indian
intelligence report noted that some infl uential Muslim leaders in the
state of Bihar had launched a campaign to collect money and volunteers
for the aid of Arabs in Palestine. These “volunteers and the collected