international factors 169anguish in the yishuv, as “a stooge in [Jewish] hands.”^16 India’s recogni-
tion of Israel and the presence of an Israeli consulate in Bombay fi gured
prominently in Pakistani discourses. They were presented as evidence
for India’s “duplicity” vis-à- vis the Arabs. While professing friendship
with the Arabs, Pakistani scholars argued that India was pursuing a sin-
ister course inimical to the ummah.
The second Indian concern revolved around Pakistan’s eff orts to forge
an Islamic bloc. During the pre- 1947 years, the Muslim League was pri-
marily interested in Islamic issues. Since the abolition of the caliphate in
1924, pan- Islamic movements made numerous eff orts toward reinstating
a caliph or forming a po liti cal forum for the ummah.^17 The Indian Mus-
lim community played a signifi cant role in some of these eff orts.^18 Exter-
nal contacts of the Muslim League during this period were restricted to
the Middle East, and they were useful when Pakistan’s foreign policy was
centered on the region. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s fi rst prime minister,
“and Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman, a prominent Muslim League leader,
were in the forefront of initiating and sponsoring numerous Islamic
conferences. Several international Islamic organizations had been estab-
lished with headquarters in Karachi.”^19 Beginning with the World Mus-
lim Congress in 1948, Pakistan hosted and or ga nized a number of offi cial
and semioffi cial Islamic meetings and conferences.^20 The mufti of Jeru-
salem was a frequent visitor to Pakistan. The ideological opposition of
Pakistan to secular Arab nationalism led by Nasser was accompanied by
its desire to forge close ties with conservative regimes in the Middle East,
such as Saudi Arabia and Iran under the shah. Its support for the pro-
Western Hashemite Kingdom resulted in strong military cooperation
with Amman.^21 Its relations with Turkey, another pro- Western country,
manifested through their joint membership in the U.S.- sponsored blocs
such as the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Or ga ni za-
tion, CENTO) and Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD). While
formation of the Or ga ni za tion of the Islamic Conference had to wait until
1969, Pakistan’s eff orts resulted in a number of Islamic gatherings
adopting positions that were unfriendly toward India.
As a result, India’s diplomatic activities in the Middle East were over-
whelmingly obsessed with Pakistan. The assessment of Eliyahu Elath,
Israel’s ambassador in London, aptly summed the prevailing situation.
After a gap of few years, on September 6, 1953, Elath met his old friend
and now India’s ambassador in Cairo, Panikkar. Reporting on this day-
long rendezvous in the En glish countryside, Elath remarked that when