172 i n t e r n a t i o n a l f a c t o r s
Canal with an Israeli fl ag fl ying. It may not be rational; it may not be
po liti cally sensible... we got Nasser to agree at fi rst that Israeli goods
could go in other ships.... [Nasser] said “we are at war with Israel
and we are not going to allow enemy to go through.” He was right....
I think the UN convention [that is, the UN Security Council resolu-
tion of September 1951 demanding freedom of navigation for Israel
through the Suez Canal] was wrong. In any case, said Nasser, we can-
not have Israeli ships going through [Suez].... Which Arab govern-
ment could permit the Israeli fl ag in their home waters, even in the
name of freedom of navigation? The Arabs would not agree to this; a
red rag to a bull is the Israeli fl ag. It may be the fault of the Arabs—
but no Arab government, no Egyptian government could agree to Is-
raeli ships going through the Canal. The Arabs claim that they are at
war with Israel. We tried some way to help solve the Israeli problem—
conditions were more suitable for them before the Suez invasion.^33These were Menon’s views when Michael Brecher interviewed him in
1964 and 1965. By then, he had resigned from the government following
the 1962 Sino- Indian War and was slowly fading away. However, his re-
marks assume importance because of his close association with Nehru
and his involvement in formulating policy during the Suez crisis. From
his observations, it is obvious that India wholeheartedly endorsed and
embraced the Arab viewpoint. It accepted the Arab contention that they
were at war with Israel and thus would not abide by international obliga-
tions or the demands of the UN Security Council. In short, India would
not endorse Israel’s right of passage through the Suez Canal. This parti-
san approach toward the Middle East, especially during the June 1967
war, caused acrimonious debate and criticism in the Indian parliament
and the media.
The importance of the Arab countries is further enhanced by India’s
strong economic ties, which date back to the pre- Christian era. The ar-
rival of Arabs and later Eu ro pe an powers on Indian shores and the hin-
terland were primarily driven by economic incentives and opportunities.
During the colonial period, much of India’s export of raw materials to
and import of fi nished produce from Britain passed through the Middle
East.^34 It was this geostrategic and geoeconomic importance that par-
tially led to the British endorsement of the Balfour Declaration. Palestine
was seen as a major staging area for British interests in India. The im-
portance of the region only increased after India’s in de pen dence, as it