4 introductionsecuring employment for some of these refugees. At the end of the World
War II, India became a safe haven for Jewish refugees from Iraq and
Af ghan i stan until their emigration to the newly formed state of Israel. Of-
fi cial hostility toward Israel but prolonged hospitality toward the Jewish
people is another paradoxical element of India’s Israel policy.
As the opposition parties argued, Nehru’s India remained hostile to
Israel even in the absence of any tensions— let alone disputes. If the pub-
lic postures are an indication, India remained more hostile to Israel than
toward its po liti cal, territorial, and military adversaries. Between 1947
and 1992, India fought four military confl icts with Pakistan and China.
In India’s assessment, both these countries are in illegal occupation of
vast Indian territories. The 1962 Sino- Indian confl ict dealt a crushing
blow to Nehru’s leadership aspirations in the Third World. In the case of
Pakistan, the hostilities often spilled into cross- border terrorism and its
support for separatist militants in Kashmir. Despite these confl icts, New
Delhi has always maintained formal ties with both Pakistan and China,
and even during the military confl icts India did not expel their ambas-
sadors. India decreased its diplomatic presence in Beijing following the
Sino- Indian war but did not terminate its relations. Israel remained an
exception. A controversial media remark even led to the Israeli consul
(the highest Israeli representative in India) being declared persona non
grata in 1982.
Israel was unique in another sense. India’s refusal to maintain formal
relations did not inhibit its leaders from seeking help and assistance from
the Jewish state. Ironically, this trend began with Prime Minister Nehru.
A few months after voting against the UN partition plan, he sought agri-
cultural experts from Israel.^8 A couple years later, despite a stalemate on
the diplomatic front, India again sought similar assistance from Israel.
This seeking help without normalization was more pronounced in the
security arena. During the 1962 Sino- Indian debacle, Nehru sought and
obtained limited quantities of military assistance from Ben- Gurion. Like-
wise, anti- Israeli statements in public did not inhibit his daughter, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, from establishing closer ties with the Israeli in-
telligence establishment.^9
This private sympathy and public hostility was common to a number of
Indian personalities. Even those who were friendlier toward Israel had
their limits, at least in public. Sardar K. M. Panikkar, India’s fi rst ambas-
sador to China, personifi ed this duality. In early 1947, he was confi dent
that after partition India would be free from Muslim infl uence and would