international factors 175
the Arab boycott. All commercial and fi nancial transactions between
Arab states and Israel were banned; postal, radio, and telegraphic com-
munications were cut off ; and a land, sea, and air embargo was enforced.
These mea sures included a host of secondary and tertiary boycotts.
Some suggest that India appeared as a late entrant on the Arab black-
list.^47 But as early as November 1947, Indian cargo passing through the
Suez Canal came under the provisions of the Arab boycott and was con-
fi scated by Egyptian authorities.^48 In line with its overall policy of not
antagonizing the Arabs, India often took pains to declare that there was
no need for Indian cargo vessels to pass through Israeli ports.^49 By 1976,
at least 128 Indian fi rms and organizations were on the Arab blacklist.^50
They included some of the leading names in the country, such as Birla,
Colgate Palmolive, Gestetner, Mahindra & Mahindra, Kirloskar, Praga
Tools (an undertaking of the Indian government), Velco, Vikram Enter-
prises, and Voltas. Their inclusion did not imply that these fi rms had any
direct trade or commercial links with Israel. A 1975 report prepared by
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI),
the most important body of Indian industry, highlighted this problem.
Following a visit to the Middle East, a FICCI delegation concluded:
The delegation would like to draw attention to the manner in which
the Arab boycott of Israel is operating, as it aff ects our trading oppor-
tunities. A number of Indian fi rms continue to be blacklisted and
borne in the register maintained at the headquarters of the Arab Boy-
cott of Israel offi ce in Damascus. In quite a number of cases the Indian
companies fi gure in the register because they have collaboration ar-
rangements with some foreign companies, say Great Britain, Ger-
many and the United States in which, there may be an Israeli on the
Board of Directors. In many such actions where requisite actions
have been taken by Indian companies, delays have occurred in get-
ting the names removed from the boycott list.^51
To remedy the situation, the January 1975 report suggested that in view of
the “friendly relations between India and the Arab world, diplomatic ef-
forts at the appropriate level should be made to ensure that no Indian
company remains on the list unless there are overriding reasons for
doing so.”^52
The power of the economic boycott reached its apogee when the Arab
states managed to convince the NAM to endorse their economic boycott.