be more sympathetic toward Zionist aspirations in Palestine. A few years
later, he even lamented India’s belated recognition of Israel. Yet in his auto-
biography, published in 1955, he sang a diff erent tune and joined the offi -
cial chorus against the formation of Israel.^10 The same holds true for
Rabindranath Tagore, a Nobel laureate, who felt that his sympathies for
Jewish nationalist aspirations in Palestine were “private” views that should
not be publicized.^11
This duality continued after India gained in de pen dence. The Israeli
collaboration with the British and French during the Suez war of 1956
provided an opportunity for Nehru, as the Israeli action had all the hall-
marks of an aggression against a fellow member of the emerging Afro-
Asian bloc and was a sign of collaboration with the imperial powers. Us-
ing the confl ict as an excuse, he formally deferred normalization with
Israel. But at the same time, he expressed no qualms about seeking closer
ties with London and Paris. Indeed, his opposition to the policies of the
imperial powers was accompanied by his desire for stronger bilateral ties
with them. The British aggression against Nasser did not impede India’s
continued membership in the British Commonwealth, and the same holds
true for Nehru’s policy toward France. It is thus not possible to explain
away India’s Israel policy within the context of its opposition to and disap-
proval of the policies of the latter or its connections to colonialism. Indeed,
with the sole exception of its opposition to apartheid in South Africa, India’s
opposition to the policies of a country was not accompanied by its refusal
to maintain normal relations with it.
Furthermore, Nehru’s strong disapproval of Israel’s action during the
Suez crisis was accompanied by an accommodating and pro- Soviet view
during the roughly contemporaneous Hungarian crisis. Even within the
Middle East, India has been selective in condemning aggression. The
anger and frustration exhibited by India following the Israeli actions
against Egypt was conspicuously absent when Saddam Hussein invaded,
occupied, and annexed Kuwait in August 1990. Likewise, Indian leaders
rarely spoke in support of the national rights or to condemn the stateless-
ness of the Kurdish people.
During the 1950s, securing international ac cep tance of communist
China was a major foreign- policy priority for Nehru. He wanted the out-
side world, especially the United States, to have normal ties with China,
even if the West had strong reservations over the nature of the govern-
ment in Beijing. He stressed that po liti cal diff erences among nations
could never be resolved through exclusion and boycott. He even urged
introduction 5