India\'s Israel Policy - P. R. Kumaraswamy

acknowledged Israel’s recognition of their country’s in de pen dence from
the Dutch. Pakistan, which had sided with the Arabs during the partition
vote in 1947, was vociferous in its opposition.^47 Eventually, all fi ve leaders
agreed to include the following passage in their joint communiqué issued
on May 2, 1954:

In considering the situation in the Middle East the Prime Ministers

indicated grave concern over the suff erings of Arab refugees in Pal-

estine. They urged the United Nations to bring about and expedite

the rehabilitation of these refugees in their original homes. The

Prime Ministers expressed deep sympathy with the Arabs of Pales-

tine in their suff erings and affi rmed their desire to see a just and

early settlement of the Palestine problem.^48

The absence of any reference to Israel and the unconditional demand for
the return of the Arab refugees was a harbinger of bad news for Israel.^49
Even though the fi nal wording fell far short of its expectations, Nehru’s
opposition provided an opportunity for Pakistan to present itself as a vig-
orous champion of the Arabs and set the tone for future Indo- Pakistani
confrontations over Israel.^50
That opportunity came a few months later, when Indonesia fl oated the
idea of holding an Afro- Asian conference.^51 In December 1954, the same
fi ve prime ministers met at Bogor, Indonesia, to work on the agenda for
the Bandung Conference. The conference aimed “to promote goodwill
and cooperation” among Afro- Asian nations.^52 They felt that the newly in-
de pen dent countries of Asia and Africa “should become better acquainted
with one another’s point of view” and agreed to invite “all countries in
Asia and Africa, which have in de pen dent governments.” However, the is-
sue of inviting the People’s Republic of China caused some anxious mo-
ments. India was adamant that any Afro- Asian meeting would be incom-
plete without China, whereas a number of countries were not friendly
toward communist China. Out of the twenty- six countries that eventually
attended the Bandung Conference, as many as eigh teen had not recog-
nized the communist takeover in Beijing.^53 Therefore, to allay their con-
cerns, the Bogor communiqué contained a rider:

The Prime Ministers wished to point out that ac cep tance of the invi-

tation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any

change in its view of the status of any other country. It implied only

nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964 191