further and decided that “participation in regional conferences or ga nized
on the initiative of one country or by an international or ga ni za tion could
not be attended if Israel were also invited.”^60 In a bid to reiterate its deter-
mination, in December 1954, only a few days before the Bogor meeting,
the Arab League declared that the Arab states would not “participate in
any regional conference where Israel is represented. The Arab states do
not have any doubt that Israel will not be invited to this conference [Band-
ung] and will not participate therein.”^61 This Arab ultimatum worked.
This hamstrung India, which was uncomfortable about Israel’s exclusion.
In the words of S. Gopal, Nehru’s close confi dant V. K. Krishna Menon
“was for an invitation to Israel with an explanation to the Arab states that
the presence of Israel committed them to nothing; Nehru, wishing to
avoid dissension even on the question of the composition of the confer-
ence, agreed with reluctance that an invitation to Israel should be ex-
tended only if the Arab countries agreed to it.”^62 Nehru was even prepared
to antagonize Sir Anthony Eden over China, but he meekly accepted Arab
dictates over Israel.^63
Speaking to Michael Brecher a year after the Bandung Conference,
Nehru admitted:
Conditions were and still are that the Arab nations and Israel don’t sit
together. They do sit at the United Nations, but apart from that, they
just don’t sit. And one is off ered this choice of having one or the
other. It is not logical, my answer, but there it is. When the proposal
was made for Israel to be invited... it transpired that if that were
done the Arab countries would not attend.... Our outlook on this
matter was based on some logical approach. Our sympathies are with
the Arab nations in regard to this problem. We felt that logically Is-
rael should be invited but when we saw that the consequences of that
invitation would be that many others would not be able to come, then
we agreed. Our approach, obviously, if I may add, is that it is good for
people who are opponents to meet.^64Devoid of diplomatic niceties, the choice was between one Israel and
many Arab states, and Nehru opted for the latter.
Krishna Menon went a step further and attributed Nehru’s buckling
under Arab pressure to Pakistan. In his long interview to Brecher shortly
after Nehru’s death, Menon disclosed that the leaders of Burma
nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964 193