India\'s Israel Policy - P. R. Kumaraswamy

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said, “we won’t come without Israel.” We said our position is the
same but we have got to carry the Arabs with us. We will do what ever
the Congress agrees but we will vote for an invitation to Israel. And
we were three to two, Ceylon, Burma and India for, and Pakistan and
Indonesia against; but Pakistan was the leader. They made propa-
ganda against us... and issued leafl ets terming us a pro- Jewish
country.^65

In his opinion, even “Indonesia might have been persuaded at that time,
but Pakistan made use of our attitude to Israel’s presence at Bandung in
propaganda with the Arabs.”^66 Had he maintained normal relations with
Israel as had U Nu, perhaps Nehru would have been more determined
and forceful. Israel’s exclusion turned Bandung into an anti- Israeli fo-
rum. By refusing to negotiate with Israel, the Arab states, led by non- Arab
Pakistan, challenged the core of the partition resolution of the United
Nations and merely settled for demanding the right of the refugees to
return to their homes.
For many, however, Bandung presented “a front of Asian unity.”
Menon refl ected the general Indian euphoria when he remarked:


Bandung was like Geneva and Locarno [1925]. These are old expres-
sions now; people don’t even know where Locarno is, whether it is in
Italy or in Switzerland, but still Locarno is a spirit.... Bandung had
become a world- known name. If you ask a lot of Canadians where is
Bandung they wouldn’t know, but probably they would know it is in
Asia, or even in Indonesia. At any rate there is a Bandung spirit.^67

In other words, its importance “was in what it began rather than what it
did.”^68 And Israel was not a part of it. Seeds were sown for its exclusion
from the emerging Afro- Asian bloc, the forerunner of the Non- Aligned
Movement. Bandung institutionalized the pro cess of the exclusion of
Israel, not only from regional po liti cal gatherings but also nonpo liti cal
forums devoted to sports, scientifi c cooperation, and so on.
Israel was aware of the fallout. Following the Bogor decision, it ap-
proached a number of countries to reverse the move. Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett wrote to his Indonesian counterpart ex-
pressing his “astonishment and regret.”^69 According to Krishna Menon,
an Israeli ambassador met Prime Minister Nehru at Bandung “coming
through Burma.”^70 The Israeli media perceived the whole episode as an


194 nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964
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