The Sino- Indian War, 1962
The complexities of India’s Israel policy came to forefront during
the Sino- Indian war of 1962. The confl ict along the Himalayas clearly
exposed India’s military weaknesses and the po liti cal naiveté of Nehru’s
China policy, and, above all, it shook his faith in nonalignment. The war
came just a year after the Belgrade Conference, which heralded the NAM.
While India had unequivocally joined the chorus against Israel during
the Suez crisis, Egypt stayed neutral during the Sino- Indian war. Presi-
dent Nasser chose not to condemn China, although Nehru had hoped
he would. Nasser felt a neutral stance was essential if Egypt planned “to
mediate” between India and China.^96
Military defeat, po liti cal isolation, and the abandonment of a friend
resulted in Nehru seeking military help from Israel. Following the out-
break of the border war, he made a universal appeal for assistance and
personally wrote to various international leaders, including Prime Minis-
ter David Ben- Gurion.^97 His negative attitude toward normalization and
his high- profi le criticism of Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956 were
temporarily forgotten, and he explicitly sought military aid from Israel.
Sharing India’s concerns, the Israeli premier extended po liti cal support
and supplied certain quantities of small arms.^98 According to the veteran
Arab journalist and Nasser’s confi dant Mohamed Hassanein Heikal,
Nehru stopped his “dealings” with Israel as soon as the Egyptian leader
raised objections.^99
India was rather coy in acknowledging Israeli assistance; however, it
was more than willing to remember and recognize the “understanding
attitude” of the Arab states.^100 Such a duality is true also of the Indian
intelligentsia, who justifi ed and rationalized Nasser’s neutrality but ig-
nored Nehru seeking military help from Israel in times of crisis.^101 This
Indian duality is neither new nor an aberration. In the late 1940s, India
sought agricultural assistance from Israel even while opposing Israel’s
membership in the United Nations. In later years, it obtained help from
Israel during military confl icts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 but was
not prepared to admit them publicly.
Thus India was not averse to approaching Israel for security assis-
tance, and Nehru himself established this pre ce dent. At the same time,
driven by other interests in the Middle East, it was unwilling to recognize
such help in public. It was only after normalization that India gradually
began admitting military- security help from Israel, and even this was
nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964 199