202 the years of hardened hostility, 1964–1984who had exerted a moderating infl uence. As the host, Nasser had greater
infl uence and leverage in formulating a hardline position.
As a sequel to the summit, in November that year, New Delhi hosted a
delegation from the Nasser- sponsored and newly formed Palestine Lib-
eration Or ga ni za tion. In a similar move, it became friendlier toward the
Arab League. The Arab Information Offi ce, which had been functioning
in New Delhi since 1959, was granted diplomatic status in July 1965.^2 If
one compares this upgrading to the April 1964 controversy over Israeli
In de pen dence Day, the contrast is obvious. The diff erential treatment re-
affi rmed India’s predisposition in the Middle East. While the Israeli mis-
sion was a consulate in far- off Bombay, often seen as India’s “diplomatic
Siberia,” the Arab League was represented by an embassy in the national
capital and enjoyed immunities similar to those conferred upon the UN
mission in India.^3
The Indo- Pakistani war, which broke out in September 1965, tested
the seriousness of Shastri’s Israel policy. The general attitude of the
Arab states ranged from noncommitment to overt sympathy for Paki-
stan. Most had not been prepared to support India in its war with athe-
ist, communist China a few years back, and to expect them to be more
supportive in 1965 was unrealistic. Backing India now would have to
mean opposing the Islamic state of Pakistan, something the Arabs could
not contemplate. New Delhi appreciated this Arab dilemma and played
down the region’s attitude to the war. While expressing its disappointment
at individual Arab countries, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it consoled
itself in that “by and large” the Arab countries had shown an understand-
ing of its position. India did not even complain about Ira ni an assistance to
Pakistan during the war, feeling that such help had to be viewed within the
context of the Central Treaty Or ga ni za tion (CENTO), of which both coun-
tries were members.^4 The role played by President Nasser, especially at the
Casablanca Arab Summit in September 1965 in adopting a “balanced” po-
sition, received Indian appreciation.^5 At the same time, as in the past, dur-
ing the confl ict India approached Israel for limited military assistance,
which it was given.^6 While following the policy of his pre de ces sor, Shastri
gave an institutional framework to India’s pro- Arab policy, as exhibited
through developments surrounding the NAM, Arab League, and PLO.
However, a real deterioration in relations with Israel began when Indira
Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, took over the reins of power. Both domestic and
regional compulsions led to a downward spiral.