prelude to normalization 229the unpre ce dented step of briefi ng the U.S. visitors about the steps that
India had taken in that direction, such as upgrading the consular mis-
sion in Bombay. Shortly before the visit, consular jurisdiction was ex-
tended to the southern Indian state of Kerala, which has a signifi cant
Jewish population.^13
Rajiv Gandhi’s approach toward Israel was also infl uenced by shared
security concerns over Pakistan, which was India’s major preoccupation,
especially during his tenure.
Since the early 1980s, security debates inside India were dominated by
Pakistan’s strategic ambitions and its clandestine nuclear- weapons pro-
gram. Such concerns led to growing speculations of India following Is-
rael’s example and conducting an Osiraq- type preemptive strike against
Pakistan’s nuclear facility at Kahuta.^14 Its leaders had dismissed such re-
ports publicly as farfetched speculations. In an interview to Le Monde in
June 1988, Rajiv was emphatic: “We try not to conduct ourselves as cer-
tain other countries do.” When the same interviewer asked about nor-
malization of diplomatic relations, he observed: “If Israel changes its
attitude on a number of subjects, yes. But for the moment, we consider
Israel to be very bellicose and oblivious to the problems it has created.”^15
Media speculation, however, did not die down. In July of that year, with
the help of satellite photos supplied by the convicted U.S. spy Jonathan
Jay Pollard, se nior Israeli diplomats reportedly met Rajiv Gandhi’s emis-
sary in Paris. Both sides discussed the common threat posed by Paki-
stan’s nuclear program.^16 For operational and po liti cal considerations,
Israel apparently sought India’s active participation and cooperation. The
air base in Jamnagar, near the Indo- Pakistani border, was mentioned as
a possible refueling site. Quoting the former Israeli military intelligence
chief Aharon Yariv, the Indian journalist Bharat Karnad disclosed that
“several approaches [ were made] over the years... to New Delhi, some
predating the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Iraqi reactor near Baghdad, for
assistance in hitting Pakistani nuclear installations.”^17
Rajiv Gandhi’s frequent references to Pakistan’s nuclear program and
some of his controversial statements added fuel to the preemptive- strike
theory. For instance, addressing the offi cers of the National Defence Col-
lege in October 1985, he warned: “We know and are fairly sure that the
program has been fi nanced not solely by Pakistan but also by other coun-
tries. Will this mean that the weapon will be available to these countries?
How will these countries use the weapons?”^18 A couple of years later, he
again referred to external fi nancial assistance for Pakistan’s nuclear