230 prelude to normalizationprogram. In early 1987, the Washing ton Times quoted him as saying that
an Arab- funded Pakistani bomb would be Islamic and could be made
available to Arab countries. Such accusations were not new. Since the late
1970s, various Indian and Western studies focused on the Islamic aspect
of Pakistan’s nuclear program.^19 Fears were expressed over the possibility
of Islamabad reciprocating Arab fi nancial support by sharing its nuclear
technology with the donors. Gandhi became the fi rst and so far the only
Indian leader to express such an apprehension in public. His concerns
vis-à- vis Pakistan coincided with the commonly held view over the non-
conventional ambitions of “irresponsible states,” but his public remarks
displeased the Arabs.
The much- hyped Osiraq- type attack against Pakistan never material-
ized. The Indian reluctance to join with Israel and pursue a military op-
tion against the Pakistani nuclear program was logical and inevitable.
While it would gain certain tactical benefi ts, a preemptive strike against
Islamabad’s premier nuclear facility would have gone against India’s
larger interests. With vital national installations such as oil refi neries,
nuclear facilities, and other economic targets lying within the striking
range of retaliatory air strikes by Pakistan, the long- term strategic bene-
fi ts of an Osiraq- type operation were limited and indeed remain counter-
productive. Any open collaboration with Israel on an aggressive defense
policy was po liti cally costly for India, especially when it lacked the type of
superpower guarantees that Israel managed to secure following the
Osiraq bombing. Interestingly, much of the speculation occurred against
the backdrop of the December 1985 understanding between Rajiv Gandhi
and President Zia ul- Haq of Pakistan, whereby both countries agreed not
to target each other’s nuclear installations. Delays in implementing this
oral understanding partly contributed to the continued speculation.^20
However, the most visible manifestation of a shift in India’s Israel
policy manifested in the nonpo liti cal arena, especially sports. Rajiv Gan-
dhi’s decision to host the Davis Cup quarter- fi nals tennis match in July
1987 was the most crucial development that indicated a reappraisal of
India’s Israel policy.^21 It was also the most controversial Indian decision
since the incognito visit of Moshe Dayan in 1977, when the Janata govern-
ment was in power.^22 Lobbying in favor of the match, the Indian tennis
star Vijay Amritraj vehemently argued that the tie against Israel “might
be our last big chance to go some distance in Davis Cup.”^23 The likely
punitive sanction from the International Tennis Federation was a major
consideration.^24