232 prelude to normalizationArab Boycott Offi ce blacklisted twenty- nine Indian diamond fi rms for trad-
ing with Israel. Following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in May 1991, the
Indian diamond community in Israel issued a public advertisement in
the Jerusalem Post mourning the tragic loss.^33 It is also worth noting that in
November 1988 the Manufactures Association of Israel and the All- India
Association of Industries signed a cooperative agreement in Bombay.
Rajiv Gandhi’s openness toward Israel was manifested in India’s reac-
tion to some of problems facing the Middle East.
At one level, the Indian leader was not eager to play any mediatory role
in the Arab- Israeli confl ict. On more than one occasion he expressed re-
luctance to get entangled in the Middle East cobweb. Dismissing any role
in the peace pro cess, in 1986 he candidly admitted: “There are already so
many parties involved, we would not like to add one more hand in the
complicated situation. We prefer to watch for a while and see how things
turn out before actively trying to take an interest in it.”^34 At the same time,
he was tacitly signaling the need for the Arabs to seek a negotiated settle-
ment with Israel. In June 1985, few months after assuming offi ce, Gandhi
paid a state visit to Egypt and reaffi rmed India’s longstanding support for
Arabs and the Palestinians. Since the early 1950s, Egypt had dominated
India’s Middle East policy and, during Nehru’s times, even dictated In-
dia’s agenda toward Israel. This bonhomie began to wane in the wake of
the Arab debacle in the June 1967 war and the resurgence of conservative
forces in the Middle East. Thus the timing of Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Cairo
is interesting. Egypt had yet to recover from regional opposition to its
peace with Israel. While it managed to stay within the NAM, thanks partly
due to India, it still remained suspended from the Arab League and the
OIC. Gandhi’s visit to Egypt was a welcome relief to the beleaguered
Egyptian leader, Hosni Mubarak, and an affi rmative move in favor of the
Camp David accords and peace with Israel. Signs of Indian moderation
were visible toward the Palestinians as well. At one level, it strongly con-
demned Israeli air raids against the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985 as
“aggressive and expansionist” and portrayed them as a “threat to peace
and security.”^35 Simultaneously, it was not prepared to go along with the
Arab states in expelling Israel from the United Nations. Likewise, even in
the wake of the intifada and its decision to recognize the state of Palestine,
India reiterated its commitment to Israel’s right to exist in peace.
Despite these favorable signs and tentative steps, the overall transfor-
mation of the policy toward Israel eluded the Indian leader. While his
moves eventually worked in favor of normalization, Rajiv Gandhi was