India\'s Israel Policy - P. R. Kumaraswamy

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236 prelude to normalization
As a result, Narasimha Rao, who did not even contest the parliamen-
tary elections, emerged as the consensus candidate of the Congress Party
and on June 21 was sworn in as India’s prime minister. His tenure began
on an ominous note. On June 27, less than week after he assumed offi ce,
Kashmiri militants killed an Israeli tourist and kidnapped another. This
tested the offi cial policy toward Israel, especially as Israelis became the
victims of the ongoing militancy in Kashmir. Rao waived normal restric-
tions imposed upon the Bombay- based Israeli consul and off ered full co-
operation in resolving the unfolding situation. In an unpre ce dented ges-
ture, he approved the visit of the se nior Israeli diplomat Moshe Yegar to
coordinate diplomatic eff orts with Consul Giora Becher. During his brief
visit, the director of the Asia Desk at the Israeli Foreign Ministry held
talks with Ju nior Foreign Minister Eduardo Falerio and se nior offi cials in
New Delhi. He also spoke at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analy-
ses (IDSA), the government- funded think tank. After days of hectic
behind- the- scenes negotiations, the issue was amicably resolved with the
release of the kidnapped Israeli tourist.
Soon after the Kashmir episode, the Indian media started what could
be termed as a concerted campaign for normalization. Erstwhile critics
of Israel began reexamining their earlier position. Spearheaded by the
well- known strategic analyst–turned- academic C. Raja Mohan, the real-
ists saw normalization within the context of the emerging post– cold war
global order. There emerged a growing willingness to revisit some of the
earlier justifi cations for the anti- Israeli policy. While pro- Palestinian ele-
ments continued to insist on taking the moral high ground and cited
Mahatma Gandhi as justifi cation, other critics of the status quo urged
India to recognize and capitalize on the new Middle Eastern reality
opened up by the Kuwait war and Madrid Peace Conference.
This time around, the Indian government was not far behind public
opinion. If Yegar’s July visit was presented as a “humanitarian gesture,”
India signaled a new policy shortly after the Madrid Conference. On De-
cember 16, 1991, it joined the majority in the United Nations and voted to
repeal the notorious 1975 resolution that equated Zionism with racism.
As India had been one of the original supporters of the resolution, this
was a signifi cant move.^48 By taking this step, Rao exhibited India’s deter-
mination to move away from the past. Engagement, not isolation, and
constructive dialogue, not condemnation, became the new mantra. Even
while professing to follow the policies of his pre de ces sors, Rao signaled a
new approach toward Israel. The UN vote was followed by a meeting

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