244 n ormalization and afterOslo accords.^21 Such a negative attitude regarding normalization was
shared by opposition fi gures closely identifi ed with the left. Some attrib-
uted normalization to Rao’s willingness to comply with American dic-
tates in order to secure fi nancial assistance from the World Bank. The
establishment of “full diplomatic relations with Israel was a correct
decision... but to do so under American pressure was unwise.”^22
It was anti- Muslim. Se nior Cabinet Minister Arjun Singh warned Rao
of the consequences of normalization, especially regarding Muslim sup-
port for the party. In the words of one se nior Indian diplomat who at-
tended the crucial cabinet meeting, “Arjun Singh felt that this decision
might aff ect Muslim support for the Congress and went on to imply that
establishing relations with Israel would be a departure from the Nehru-
vian framework of our foreign policy.”^23 Arjun Singh, still hoping to be-
come prime minister, was trying to position himself as a savior of minor-
ity interests. What could be more attractive than opposing normalization
with Israel! At the same time, he was not ready to ignore the overwhelm-
ing support for normalization, and thus, though expressing his reserva-
tions inside the cabinet, he went along with the majority view. This two-
faced approach earned the education minister some negative publicity.
Singh came under criticism from some Muslim circles when he made
an offi cial visit to Israel in June 1994.^24 Partly due to the domestic po liti-
cal calculations, the former prime minister and then leading opposition
fi gure V. P. Singh registered his opposition to normalization. Refl ecting
this trend, one scholar even viewed Rao’s decision as an “anti- Muslim al-
liance,” if not a conspiracy. Rationalizing the move, he argued that the
government and its supporters sought to counter the Pakistani factor “by
forging an anti- Islamic alliance along with [sic] Israel.”^25 A few prominent
Muslim leaders were also critical of the decision, calling it “ill timed and
hasty.”^26
Wearing blinkers. The critics of Narasimha Rao were reluctant to recog-
nize, let alone adjust, to the new international reality. Both the global or-
der and Middle Eastern realities had changed radically. They were not
ready to admit the weakened position of the PLO. Having taking a pro-
Saddam position during the Kuwait crisis, many Indian intellectuals
could not fault Arafat for doing the same. Their quick endorsement of the
Iraqi decision to obliterate the existence of Kuwait meant that their sympa-
thies were with the Palestinians, who viewed Saddam as their savior.^27
This in turn prevented them from recognizing the weakened status of the
PLO after Operation Desert Storm. In a number of Persian Gulf countries,