conclusion 267
The absence of relations and avoidance of serious debate over the do-
mestic dimension have made Israel the most controversial aspect of In-
dia’s foreign policy. Ever since the issue was fi rst raised in the Constituent
Assembly in December 1947, more than fi ve months before its establish-
ment, Israel remained a hotly contested and passionately debated foreign-
policy issue in India. For the non- INC opposition parties, Israel became
an important po liti cal instrument to criticize the government. During
upheavals like the June war, the Indian parliament witnessed heated, up-
roarious, and acrimonious debates. At times, the Indian government found
itself on a shaky wicket, for example during the row over the September
1969 Rabat fi asco.
India’s Israel policy is not exclusively domestic. Such an understand-
ing would be wrong, misleading, and incomplete. While domestic con-
cerns regarding the Muslim population resulted in India viewing the
Jewish- Israeli problem through an Islamic prism, there are also other
secular and nonreligious considerations. Its concerns vis-à- vis Pakistan
in the Middle East are driven by calculations of national interest. The
numerical strength of the Arab and Islamic countries and Pakistan’s ef-
forts to forge an Islamic front dominated its thinking. This competition
at times resulted in India making controversial choices, like its futile at-
tempts at attending the Rabat conference.
Indeed, for de cades Pakistan functioned as India’s litmus test for its
relations with the outside world. This, however, could not be imple-
mented in the Middle East. Its pro- Palestinian stance did not yield po liti-
cal dividends in the Middle East, and on numerous occasions it was dis-
appointed over Arab support for Pakistan. The lack of Arab reciprocity
during confl icts with Pakistan did not result in any dramatic Indian
moves. India could neither demand reciprocity nor retaliate for the Arabs’
pro- Pakistan position. In fact, India could not even publicly criticize the
Arabs for letting their old friend down during crucial moments. If its po-
liti cal leverage, especially after 1962, was limited, its economic leverage
was non ex is tent. It was vulnerable to Arab economic and energy pres-
sures. India settled for the least re sis tance: suff ering in silence. By not
openly discussing the Arab reaction and by praising their “understanding,”
it sought to minimize any negative fallout. By not responding forcibly, it
hoped to convince the Arabs to reexamine their pro- Pakistan position.
Thus India never took the Arabs to task for their prolonged pro- Pakistan
stance and their refusal to accommodate India despite the latter acceding
to their demands on Israel. Thus India kept Israel at a distance to placate
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