conclusion 269to promote its interests in the Middle East. It was unable to make a dis-
tinction between bilateral ties and multilateral problems. It had yet to
learn the art of conveying its disagreements with the policies of Israel
while maintaining formal ties. It is often forgotten that even those par-
ties that clamored for the normalization of relations were equally critical
of Israel’s occupation of the Arab lands following the June war. Normal-
ization did not have to be an endorsement of Israel’s policies. But India
was not pursuing a nuanced approach.
Thus the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel in Jan-
uary 1992 has to be seen within the wider context of the far- reaching do-
mestic changes that were happening within India. Despite the obvious
shortcomings both within and outside the country, there are today sug-
gestions of a “rising” India and unmistakable signs of great- power aspi-
rations. The tone for this grand self- imagery, both problematic and exag-
gerated, was set by some of the critical decisions taken by the Rao
government, which signaled the arrival of a new India. While pretending
to adhere to the “continuity” of Nehru’s sociopo liti cal model, the Con-
gress Party made nuanced changes. Its leadership signaled a re orientation
of foreign policy and in the pro cess redefi ned India’s role on the world
stage. Abandoning the Soviet model, the Indian leadership also opted for
economic reforms that fundamentally changed its domestic and foreign-
policy priorities. The transformation was slow but decisive, and it resulted
from a set of complex social, po liti cal, and economic factors and compul-
sions that aff ected every aspect of the Indian polity.
The period between the late 1980s and the early 1990s was one of im-
mense po liti cal instability, social turmoil, and economic crisis. Po liti cal
violence and separatist militants in Punjab, Kashmir, and the northeast
undermined internal security. These challenges were complicated by po-
liti cal ineptness, raising doubts about national unity and cohesion. Within
a span of six years, both Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv
fell to terrorists. Perpetual discord over caste and communalism threat-
ened social cohesion. The decision to empower members of lower castes
through increased affi rmative action resulted in a backlash from those
wedded to meritocracy. Around the same time, Hindu- Muslim commu-
nity harmony reached its nadir. Decimated in the earlier elections, the
Hindu right sought better po liti cal fortunes by raising the question of
the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. There were widespread tensions and com-
munal passions in diff erent parts of the country, which, coupled with
the shortsightedness of po liti cal leaders, considerably weakened many