272 c o n c l u s i o nin New Delhi, India’s foreign policy has been more realistic. Despite their
diff erences when in opposition, both mainstream parties, namely the Con-
gress Party and the BJP, have pursued a markedly pro- U.S. policy when in
power.
Finally, India’s new foreign policy has abandoned its erstwhile binary
shibboleths. Normalization and its new friendship with Israel has not
meant the abandonment of the Palestinians. This approach has not been
confi ned to the Middle East: there are other examples. Since the early
1990s, India has strengthened its relations with the United States with-
out weakening its ties with the Rus sian Federation. Likewise, India seeks
closer ties with both Tehran and Washington.
Normalization marked the second phase of India’s relationship with
Israel, in which India recognized that it was possible and necessary to
maintain closer ties with Israel and the Arabs. In this pragmatic world-
view, India’s new relationship with Israel was not an abandonment, let
alone betrayal, of the Palestinians. Given that the Palestinians and other
Arab neighbors were seeking a negotiated po liti cal settlement with the
Jewish state, there was no compelling reason for India to treat Israel as an
outcast. Once the Madrid Middle East peace pro cess began in October
1991, where was the need to be more Palestinian than Arafat?
Even nearly two de cades after normalization, Israel continues to draw
considerable attention within India. While progress has been slower than
many have hoped, relations have blossomed. Even the al- Aqsa intifada
could not bring about a “course correction,” as many on the left demanded.
Domestic pressures do result in India not favoring any high- profi le con-
tacts with Israel, the visit of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September
2003 being an exception. With the sole exception of Egypt, most of the
Arab and Islamic countries have come to terms with Indo- Israeli bilateral
ties. Signifi cant improvements in its relations with principal Islamic
countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia happened after and not before
Indo- Israeli normalization. Even Pakistan, which in the past was paranoid
about an Indo- Israeli “conspiracy against the Islamic world,” is not averse
to moving closer to Israel.
India’s relationship with Israel has slowly moved into a third and more
complex phase: namely, the delinking of bilateral relations from the vaga-
ries of the Middle Eastern peace pro cess. It has strong reservations over
the direction and substance of the peace pro cess and diff ers with Israel
over key issues such as Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, na-
tional boundaries, the question of Jerusalem, and combating Palestinian