if one presents these through a secular paradigm or Marxist jargons, the
sentimental response of the Indian Muslims to the Arab- Israeli confl ict
is real. As a gentile, kafi r, infi del, and pagan, a secular Hindu might be
indiff erent to the contested claims over the Holy Land and might even
consider the city of Jerusalem about as relevant as Alaska. This is not
possible for a believer. For a Muslim, conservative or otherwise, Jerusa-
lem is not, say, Berlin, which could be divided and then reunifi ed due to
po liti cal compulsions. Nor is the division of Palestine akin to the Korean
Peninsula, which stands divided due to ideological animosity. Whether
stated explicitly or camoufl aged in secular jargon, religion plays an im-
portant role in shaping the views of Indian Muslims toward the Middle
East. This is more palpable and pronounced toward Israel and Israel only.
For example, the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, the prolonged Syrian
presence in Lebanon, or the Ira ni an occupation of three islands belong-
ing to the United Arab Emirates is largely ignored by Indian Muslims.
Even the Iraqi invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait did not
receive universal condemnation of the community. The Kurdish struggle
for self- determination rarely evokes their interest. Israel’s policy toward
the Palestinians, in contrast, generates widespread attention, criticism,
and condemnation from the Indian Muslims.
Thus no Indian government could ignore the strong Muslim senti-
ments regarding the Middle East without undermining India’s demo-
cratic credentials. While the extent to which a par tic u lar government is
prepared to go varies, Muslim sentiments fi gure prominently in India’s
Israel policy. At the same time, po liti cal compulsions prevented the In-
dian leaders from openly admitting to the “Muslim factor” to explain the
prolonged absence of diplomatic relations. Such an admission was seen
as “communal” and nonsecular. But in their private conversations with
Israeli leaders, many, including Prime Minister Nehru, admitted that
domestic compulsions over Muslims prevented normalization.
This duality was true for the mainstream Indian intelligentsia. Many
have no problem in attributing the pro- Israeli sentiments of the right- wing
groups, parties, and individuals to their animosity toward Muslims and
Islam. It is widely argued that the Hindu right is pro- Israeli because it is
anti- Muslim. The converse argument, however, remains anathema to
mainstream scholars. Any suggestion that the Congress Party was un-
friendly toward Zionism and Israel because of pro- Muslim po liti cal calcu-
lations is vehemently denied, dismissed, and even vilifi ed as a conspiracy.
introduction 15