- international factors 305
- For a detailed discussion, see Kramer, Islam Assembled.
- Shukat Ali, for example, was a moving spirit behind the Jerusalem confer-
ence of 1931. - Bahadur, “Pakistan as a Factor in Indo- OIC Relations,” 21.
- For details, see Pirzada, “Pakistan and the OIC,” 14– 38.
- A Pakistani military unit headed by Brigadier (later General and President)
Zia ul- Haq was training the Jordanian army during the Black September
massacre of the Palestinians in 1970. A few years later, Zia was honored by
King Hussein for his “ser vices” to the Hashemite Kingdom. Ali, Can Pakistan
Survive? Death of a State, 224n; and Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 27. - Eliahu Elath to Walter Eytan (September 8, 1953), ISA, 2413/29.
- Eliahu Sasson to S. Divon (December 28, 1950), ISA, 53/6b. Emphasis
added. - Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.
- For a detailed discussion, see Abidi, “India’s Policy Towards Muslim States.”
- Agwani, “India and the Islamic World,” 6.
- Jansen, Militant Islam, 96.
- India, MEA Report 1948– 1949, 4.
- Marwah, “India’s Relations with West Asian, North African Countries,” 22.
- Heikal, The Cairo Document, 277– 299.
- Ibid., 280.
- Akbar, Nehru, 497.
- Brecher, India and World Politics, 67– 68, 77.
- Despite its initial opposition to the French undertaking this venture, the
shortened route became vital for British interests in India. In the very fi rst
year of its operation, British shipping accounted for as much as 71 percent of
the total cargo handled by the Suez Canal. This preeminence continued
until after World War II, and the gradual decline coincided with waning
power of the British Empire. The British share was 62.59 percent in 1946,
47.23 in 1947, 37.63 in 1948, 32.11 in 1954, and 28.33 in 1955. For complete
fi gures between 1869 and 1955, see Farnie, East and West of Suez, 751– 752. - Agwani, Contemporary West Asia, 216.
- Debates LS, series 2, vol. 41 (March 31, 1960), 8909; series 3, vol. 3 (May 16,
1962), 4617. - Srivastava, “India- Israel Relations,” 257– 258.
- Driven by the need to evacuate thousands of Indians who were stranded in
Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion, India sided with Saddam Hussein and
even closed its embassy in Kuwait within days after the invasion. It was only
after the successful airlifting of about 150,000 Indians was completed in
October 1990 that India became more critical of Iraq. For a discussion see
Jayaramu, “India and the Gulf Crisis: Pro- Iraq or Pro- India.” - International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2005, 254.
- Until the Kuwait crisis and subsequent UN sanctions, Iraq was India’s prin-
cipal oil supplier. - For a recent discussion, see Feiler, From Boycott to Economic Cooperation.
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