India\'s Israel Policy - P. R. Kumaraswamy

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and Asian Nationalism, 203– 204. The full- fl edged Israeli consulate in India
became operational only 1953.


  1. Menon also referred to an incident when the Lebanese ambassador to India
    walked out of an offi cial Indian party in October 1964 because of the pres-
    ence of an Indian professor who was a member of the Indo- Israel Cultural
    Society. Brecher, India and World Politics, 79.

  2. Brecher, India and World Politics, 80.

  3. David Ben- Gurion’s statement of January 5, 1957, quoted in New Outlook
    (Tel Aviv) 1, no. 3 (September 1957): 21. This was a radical change in Israel’s
    stand. On the eve of the Suez crisis, Nehru received “an informal mes-
    sage... from the Prime Minister of Israel to the eff ect that Israel had made
    a mistake in leaning on the Western Powers and the Israelis now realized
    more than ever that they were of Asia and must look to Asia.” Gopal, Jawa-
    harlal Nehru, 2:277. Gopal did not identify the person, but perhaps he was
    referring to Moshe Sharett, the former Israeli prime minister who had met
    Nehru in New Delhi on October 30, 1956.

  4. Some of the best documentary works on the crisis include Eayrs, ed., The
    Commonwealth and Suez; U.S. State Department, The Suez Canal Problem;
    and India, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Suez Canal: Nationalization and After. On
    the legal aspects, see Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation with Special Reference
    to International Waterways in the Middle East; Obeita, The International Sta-
    tus of the Suez Canal; and, on India, see Mohan, “India, Pakistan, Suez, and
    the Commonwealth.”

  5. For the complete text of Menon’s statement at the London Conference, see
    U.S. State Department, The Suez Canal Problem, 159– 178.

  6. For Nehru’s statement in the parliament, Debates LS, series 1, vol. 7, part 2
    (August 8, 1956), cols. 2536– 2544.

  7. Ibid.

  8. U.S. State Department, The Suez Canal Problem, 174– 175.

  9. For the full text, see http:// domino .un .org/ UNISPAL .NSF/ 181c4bf00c44e5fd
    85256cef0073c426/ 38a514ea8dc0d345852560c20072ecb6.
    8 2. Foreign Aff airs Record 2, no. 10 (October 1956): 150.

  10. Jawaharlal Nehru to Anthony Eden (November 1, 1956), cited in Gopal, Jawa-
    harlal Nehru, 2:286.
    8 4. The Hindu (November 2, 1956).

  11. For a detailed discussion, see Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:291– 299.

  12. Eden, Full Circle, 545; Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:291.

  13. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 2:292.
    8 8. Debates LS, series 1, vol. 9, part 2 (November 20, 1956), col. 592. For a simi-
    lar statement, see Debates LS, series 2, vol. 3 (July 23, 1957), 4832.

  14. “My anger was the greater because the invasion [the Suez crisis] diverted at-
    tention from Hungary and I felt that if the world’s attention could be concen-
    trated on Hungary, the Soviet Union might decide not to crush the revolt.”
    Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 150.

  15. nehru and the era of deterioration, 1947–1964 311

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