342 i n d e x
16; statement on need for Muslim
control of Jazirat al- Arab (1922), 45;
summary of omissions in policies,
47; tensions with the Muslim
League, 74– 81; and UN negotiations
on the creation of Israel, 89; and
U.S. relations, 272; and World War
II, 47; and the yishuv, 44– 67. See also
Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Rajiv;
Nehru, Jawaharlal; Rao, P. V.
Narasimha; UPA government
Congress Working Committee (CWC),
45, 46, 70– 71
consular relations, 126– 31, 136; Israeli
consul expelled for comments on
Arab infl uences, 222, 227;
Pakistan’s objections to Israeli
consulate in Bombay, 169; and Rajiv
Gandhi government, 227– 29; and
Rao government, 236
“continuity and change” policy toward
Israel, 221, 252, 269
CWC. See Congress Working
Committee
Cynowitz, H. Z., 113
Czech crisis of 1968, 20Dafni, Reuven, 130
Das, Taraknath, 90
Davis Cup tennis match, 226, 230– 31,
233, 317n23
Dayan, Moshe, 135, 154, 204,
218– 22
Dayan, Ruth, 135
Declaratory Theory of Recognition,
117
demographics of Muslim population, 11,
142
Desai, Morarji, 3, 153– 54, 217– 22
Dhimmi concept of Jews, 12, 54, 72,
276n17
diamond trade, 232, 255– 56
diplomatic contacts, 131– 37, 287n52;
bilateral visits between India and
Israel, 134– 35; and communists,Congress Party (continued)
Muslim appeasement, 159;
declaration of Palestine Day, 45,
61; demand for direct Arab- Jewish
cooperation, 46; early statements
and resolutions on Palestine, 45– 47,
49; erosion of strength in 1967
and Indira Gandhi’s subsequent
dependence on small parties, 203;
expectations that partition of the
subcontinent would permit India to
adopt a pro- Jewish homeland stance,
81– 84, 159, 168, 182, 186– 87; and
Holocaust, 50, 52; inability to
endorse a Jewish homeland while
objecting to partition of the
subcontinent, 13, 84, 264; and
Islamic prism, 68– 84, 266; and
Jewish refugees in India, 50– 52;
and June war of 1967, 204– 10;
and Khilafat movement, 12– 13, 45,
69– 73; loss of hegemony, 270; and
Moshe Dayan’s visit to India, 219– 21;
need for Hindu- Muslim unity
against the British, 69– 70; Nehru
as spokesman on foreign aff airs,
47– 53; objections to Muslim League’s
argument for religious partition of
the subcontinent, 13; objections to
Zionist collaboration with British,
37, 49– 50; Palestine issue as tool in
competition with Muslim League
for support of Muslim population
of India, 13, 22, 55, 74– 81, 89, 266;
and post- 1992 relations, 254;
pro- Iraq stance in Kuwait crisis,
154; prominent positions given to
Muslims, 79, 89, 92– 93, 145, 146;
rationale for stance on Palestine
issue, 53– 56; reluctant ac cep tance
of partition of the subcontinent,
7, 13, 79– 80, 264– 65; rivalry with
Muslim League transformed into
India- Pakistan rivalry, 163– 64;
secularization of Middle East policy,