354 i n d e x
Nanda, B. R., 73
Nasser, Gamal Abdel: and June war of
1967, 204– 5, 207, 211; and NAM
meeting of 1964, 201; and Nehru,
124, 171, 190, 198, 266; and Pakistan,
169; and PLO, 177
National Demo cratic Alliance (NDA)
co ali tion government (1998– 2004),
141, 160– 62, 248, 251, 252, 262,
322n69
NDA. See National Demo cratic Alliance
(NDA) co ali tion government
Nedivi, Joseph, 27
Nehru, B. K., 127
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 119, 132– 33, 151, 156,
185, 246, 265, 296n63, 321n42;
ac cep tance of partition of the
subcontinent, 79– 80; and
anticolonialism/anti- imperialism,
48– 49, 55, 145, 249; and Asaf
Ali, 90– 91; and Asian Relations
Conference of 1947, 183– 88; attitude
toward religion, 144; and Azad,
18– 19, 147– 50, 265; and Bandung
Afro- Asian Conference of 1955,
190– 94; and Bose, 282n41; and Cold
War, 9; contacts with Zionists, 62,
66– 67, 132– 33, 152, 165, 265; on date
of Israeli request for recognition,
109; death of, 200; and delayed
normalization following recognition,
125– 26, 147– 50, 265; deteriorating
relations with Israel (1947– 1964),
182– 200; diffi culties with views, 49;
domestic criticism of pro- Arab
stance, 17; early views on Palestine
question (1933– 1947), 47– 53, 186,
296n74; and eff ect of partition of
the subcontinent on India’s
Muslims, 151; and Elath, 151; and
Eytan, 132– 33, 152, 165, 265; federal
plan for Palestine, 80, 85, 246; as
foreign aff airs spokesman for INC,
47– 53; and Holocaust, 49– 50;
and al- Husseini, grand mufti ofMuslim population (continued)
(grand mufti of Jerusalem), 60– 61;
India’s admissions about Muslim
infl uence, 150– 58; India’s need to
take into account, without openly
acknowledging pro- Muslim stance,
15– 16; infl uence on Gandhi’s
thinking, 29, 42; infl uence on
Nehru, 144– 46; and Iran’s nuclear
program, 155– 56; and Khilafat
movement, 12– 13, 60, 69– 73, 143;
and Kuwait crisis, 154; Muslim
League’s self- portrayal as sole
representative of Indian Muslims,
79, 89; Muslims appointed to
prominent assignments related to
Palestine, 145, 146; and need for
Hindu- Muslim unity against the
British, 55; and need for India to
maintain credentials as democracy,
139; and opposition to normalization
during Rao administration, 244;
opposition to Zionism, 59– 60; and
Palestine as integral part of Jazirat
al- Arab, 59– 60; Palestine issue as
Congress Party tool for enhancing
pro- Arab and pro- Islamic credentials
in competition with the Muslim
League, 13, 22, 55, 74– 81, 266;
Panikkar’s recognition of infl uence,
81– 84; and pan- Islamic movements,
169; post- partition population
remaining in India, 83, 103, 265;
protests over visits of Israeli
diplomats, 156; role of Muslim
population compared to role of U.S.
Jews in infl uencing U.S.’s Israel
policies, 16– 17, 55, 157; Shia
population, 156; softening of
opposition to Israel, 22– 23, 241, 268;
and yishuv’s interest in India, 59;
Zionist contacts with, 63
Naidu, Sarojini, 62
NAM. See Non- Aligned Movement