index 355
Nepal, 217, 313n11
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 254
Nevidi, Joseph, 35
“New Delhi Diary” (Eytan), 132
The New States of Asia (Brecher), 150
Non- Aligned Movement (NAM):
condemnation of Camp David
accords, 219; and economic boycott
of Israel, 175– 76; institutionalization
of anti- Israeli sentiment, 167, 223;
and Iran- Iraq war, 304n8; Israel’s
exclusion from, 167; and Munich
massacre of 1972, 180; and PLO,
177; reduction of anti- Israeli climate
following end of the Cold War, 239;
and Shastri’s stance on Israel, 201– 2
Noorani, A. G., 212
normalization of relations with Israel,
268; bud getary issues, 123– 24;
consequences of, 271; consular
relations, 126– 31; date of, 224, 238;
and diplomatic contacts, 131– 37;
domestic opposition during Rao
administration, 242– 45; embassies,
245; and emphasis on convergences,
11; India’s position on Palestinians
following normalization, 246– 47,
268; international responses, 258– 63;
lack of immediate references to
normalization of relations following
recognition, 114– 15; media campaign
in favor of, 236; Nehru’s original
intentions to establish relations,
122– 23; as paradigm shift, 246;
parallel ties, 245– 48; prelude to (see
normalization of relations with
Israel, prelude to); rationale for
normalization in 1992, 239– 42, 268;
reasons for nonrelations shortly
after recognition, 122– 26, 265;
response of minority parties,
253– 54; and Suez crisis of 1956, 5,
124, 198; and U.S. relations, 271. See
also India– Israel relations
(post- 1992); Rao, P.V. NarasimhaJerusalem, 283n72; ideological
worldview, 19– 21, 144; initial
commitment to normalization, 18,
133, 265; international ac cep tance
of communist China as priority for,
5– 6; international climate and
India’s foreign policy calculations
not favorable to pro- Israeli policy,
19– 20; invitation to visit Israel
declined, 126; and Israeli consular
presence in Bombay, 128; Israeli
participation in Suez War of 1956 as
excuse for deferring normalization,
5; and Jewish refugees in India, 3– 4,
50– 52, 281n39; and Kashmir
confl ict, 168; Muslims appointed to
prominent assignments related to
Palestine, 145, 146; and Nasser, 124,
171, 190, 198, 266; and negotiations
in UN Special Session, 87– 93;
normalization formally ruled out
after Suez crisis, 198; normalization
prevented by domestic compulsions
over Muslims, 14– 15, 19, 144– 46,
151– 52, 156; objections to Zionist
collaboration with British, 37, 49;
opposition to UN membership for
Israel, 188; original intentions to
establish relations, 122– 23; policy
toward France, 5; pro- Soviet stance
during Hungarian crisis, 5; and
recognition of Israel, 111– 15, 119; and
secularism, 139, 147; selective
condemnation of aggression, 5, 197;
and Sino- Indian confl ict of 1962,
199– 200; as sole arbiter of foreign
policy, 149, 182; and Soviet invasion
of Hungary, 20, 197; statement on
foreign policy vision, quoted by
Eytan, 10– 11; and Suez crisis of 1956,
5, 20, 164, 196; and technical/
military assistance from Israel, 4, 21,
113, 199, 321n43; and UNSCOP,
94– 97
Nehru, R. K., 51, 132