123ConClusIon
During much of the Cold War, the Indo-Saudi relations were dominated
more by contrasts than by convergences. Internally there were societal and
ideological differences and externally there were limited interests and pol-
icy convergences which prevented them from developing meaningful
political exchanges. Though both were members of the NAM, their views
and interpretations differed considerably. Saudi support for Pakistan, both
political and strategic, undermined India’s trust in the al-Saud leadership,
and until its economic liberalization, India’s financial clout was negligible.
For its part, Riyadh was apprehensive of India’s close politico-strategic ties
with Moscow, especially over issues such as Arab radicalism and later on
the Afghan crisis.
Under such circumstances of limited interest convergence and political
exchanges, the Palestinian issue became their most visible common
agenda. India’s support for the political rights of the Palestinians and its
prolonged refusal to normalize relations with Israel were not dissimilar to
the Islam-based Saudi opposition to Israel and its right to exist. As a result,
there was a considerable interest convergence, especially until the Indo-
Israeli normalization of 1992. India’s decision to shift its policy towards
Israel came against the backdrop of the Madrid conference, diminishing
role of Palestine in inter-Arab dynamics and the emergence of a world
order dominated by the US. Saudi Arabia was a party to some of these
changes and could not fault India for its shift on Israel.
Above all, since the early 1980s, Saudi leaders have been indicating a
conditional acceptance of Israel and this became more useful in the post-
1992 era when India sought to balance its newly found bonhomie with
Israel with its traditional support for the Palestinians. Reflecting this shift,
the Indo-Saudi joint statements referred to `the two-state solution’ and
their mutual commitments towards a peaceful resolution of this conflict.
Thus, while they highlighted their common interests, the repeated empha-
sis on the Palestinian issue also reveals the lack of political convergence
elsewhere. This was more prominent during the Cold War years when
India’s economic interactions and relevance vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia were
limited and skewed in favour of oil imports. These were to change and
change dramatically with the end of the Cold War and the opening of new
avenues for India.
PALESTINE FACTOR