India\'s Saudi Policy - P. R. Kumaraswamy, Md. Muddassir Quamar

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the two state solution.” Both declared Israeli settlement activities in the
Occupied Territories as “a fundamental stumbling block” for the peace
process.
Moreover, for quite sometime, especially since the September 11
attacks, the Kingdom has been at the receiving end of international
criticisms over its endorsement of and ideological and financial support to
various Islamist movements across the globe (Crane et al. 2009 , 43–58).
The involvement of Muslim militant groups and individuals in some of the
terror attacks accentuated the negative image of Saudi Arabia and even
Islam. Hence, recognizing the phenomena of “terrorism, extremism and
violence” which “threatens all societies” both leaders vowed that these
actions should “not be linked to any race, colour or belief.” In combating
the menace, both pledged to exchange information relating to “terrorist
activities, money laundering, narcotics, arms and human trafficking.”
Both leaders took note of the growing international concerns over the
Iranian nuclear programme and by the time Singh visited Riyadh the UN
Security Council as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency had
adopted a number of resolutions and imposed sanctions against Iran.
Reflecting these concerns, the Riyadh Declaration called for a resolution
of the problem “peacefully through negotiation” and urged Iran to work
towards removing “regional and international doubts about its nuclear
programme.” At the same time, it also recognized the right of “Iran and
other countries” to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the violence-
ravaged Iraq and Afghanistan, it called for “security and stability.”
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit was followed by the visit of the
then Crown Prince Salman to India in February 2014. The joint state-
ment issued at the end of his visit reiterated the commitment of both
countries outlined in Delhi and Riyadh Declarations (Annexure 8 ). It also
directed the General Investment Authority in Saudi Arabia (SAGIA) and
Invest India to facilitate two-way investments in “petrochemical indus-
tries, pharmaceuticals (and) medical equipments.” Riyadh reiterated its
“commitments to meet any future requirement of India” for crude oil.
This vague and open-ended commitment came against the backdrop of
growing uncertainties over India’s ability to import oil from Iran due to
US-led sanctions. As discussed in a later chapter, the spurt in the Saudi
share in India’s oil imports was partly due to the Kingdom stepping in to
make up for the drops in imports from Iran.
During Salman’s visit both sides also signed an MoU on Defence
Cooperation which promised to “institutionalize and strengthen” bilateral


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