India\'s Saudi Policy - P. R. Kumaraswamy, Md. Muddassir Quamar

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In recent years, especially since the Delhi Declaration of 2006, there
were no direct or indirect references to Pakistan in Indo-Saudi joint
statements. This would change subtly this time and both leaders used
“menace of extremism and terrorism” to convey their disapproval and
“called on all states to reject the use of terrorism against other coun-
tries, dismantle terrorism infrastructure where they happen to exist and
to cut off any kind of support and financing to terrorists operating
and perpetrating terrorism from their territories against other states;
and bring perpetrators of acts of terrorism to justice.” The phraseology
was a reiteration of the traditional Indian position vis-à-vis Pakistan and
the latter’s endorsement of, if not logistical support for, various terror
acts carried out against India. Indeed, “bringing perpetrators of acts of
terrorism to justice” is a euphemism for its demand for the trial or
deportation of Hafiz Saeed suspected to be the mastermind of the 26
November 2008 terror attack in Mumbai that killed at least 166 per-
sons (Express Web Desk 2016b). Growing discord between Riyadh and
Islamabad over a host of issues such as sectarianism and Yemen crisis
could be cited as the possible reason for al-Saud agreeing to Modi’s
phrasing.
Moreover, Modi’s rhetoric against terrorism found a receptive audience
in Riyadh, which was facing the menace both internally and in the region.
Terrorist violence undermines the Saudi regional interests, especially in
Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria and some of them were attributed to
Iran. While some of them affected its strategic interests in these countries,
others were the result of its prolonged support to extremism since the
Afghan days of the 1980s. Thus, terrorism was no longer an external phe-
nomenon but a threat to its interests. This resulted in Modi and Salman
agreeing to “strengthen law-enforcement, anti-money laundering, drug
trafficking and other transnational crimes.” Towards this end, an MoU on
“Cooperation in the Exchange of intelligence related to Money
Laundering, Terrorism Financing and Related Crimes” was signed during
Modi’s visit (India, MEA 2016b). In short, though the target of their
primary concern varied, both agreed to fight against state-sponsored ter-
rorism directed at their respective interests.
Both leaders agreed to work towards preventing the use of cyberspace
“for terrorism, radicalization and for disturbing social harmony” and “to
counter radicalization and misuse of religion by groups and countries for
inciting hatred, perpetuating and justifying terrorism for pursuing political
aims.” Besides tough security measures, they called for “exchanges and


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