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The US
Since the end of the Second World War, the US has dominated the Middle
Eastern landscape. Through a host of political strategies, military arrange-
ments, sustained arms sales and energy security linkages, the US has pos-
ited itself as a Middle Eastern power with vital stakes and influence. For
decades, Washington has been able to manage and balance its strategic
interests vis-à-vis Israel and the energy interest vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
Despite substantial differences between its two interlocutors, the US pre-
vailed as a security guarantor to the Kingdom as well as the Jewish State,
and this balancing was viewed enviously by other great powers, especially
the USSR. Occasional differences and tensions did not impede the US
from following a policy whereby both these Middle Eastern countries felt
beholden to Washington. For example, the Arab anger over President
Richard Nixon rushing emergency military supplies during the October
1973 War was not that damaging. Before long, the US emerged as the
principal military supplier to both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide.
The ascendance of the US influence in the Middle East during the Cold
War was partly facilitated by the omissions and commissions of other
powers. Post-War Britain could not retain its economic strength and was
forced to give up its colonial positions that culminated in the East of Suez
policy completed in 1971 (Peden 2012 ; Darby 1970 ; Roucek 1968 ). Its
misadventure, in collaboration with France and Israel, against President
Gamal Abdul Nasser over the Suez Canal proved disastrous as Britain had
to surrender to the dictates of President Dwight Eisenhower (Beck 2009 ;
Peterson 1997 ). This largely marked the end of British dominance in the
Middle East and its limited sway was confined to monarchies such as
Bahrain, Jordan and Oman. Traditionally the French influence was
confined to pockets such as Algeria and Lebanon, which also diminished
after the Suez War.
The Soviet role was more complicated. Joseph Stalin played a midwife
when the UN General Assembly adopted the partition plan in November
1947 as he viewed the Jewish State as a potential ally. This was mostly due
to the socialist orientation of the Labour Zionism which dominated the
pre-state Jewish community in Palestine and later on the State of Israel.
After the communist revolution in China, Moscow even witnessed initial
diplomatic contacts between Israel and the leadership of the People’s
Republic of China. Growing political differences over Cold War issues
such as the Korean crisis did not impede Israel and USSR from maintain-
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR