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as well as the al-Qaida leader Osama bin-Laden. Domestic criticisms
largely forced the Kingdom to scale down the US military presence and
eventually in 2003 all the remaining US combat forces were withdrawn
except for a small number training and support role for the
USMTM. Though it was a major setback, the US strengthened its military
bases in Bahrain which also hosts the headquarters of Fifth Fleet and the
al-Udeid air base in Qatar.
Against this background, some of the strategic choices of Riyadh ran
counter to New Delhi. If in the 1950s and 1960s, Nasserism dominated
the Indian approach towards the Middle East, the 1970s saw the
oil-for- arms linkage which made Saudi Arabia becoming closer to the
US. This manifested in the Afghan crisis when India and Saudi Arabia
found themselves in opposite camps. Riyadh was the lead player in the
US-led campaign against the Soviet invasion and provided political legiti-
macy, financial support and above all military training and supplies to the
Afghan Mujahedeen who were fighting the Soviets.
This enabled Pakistan playing an active role in shoring up anti-Soviet
forces and in the process ingratiating itself to the US. The formation of the
US-Saudi-Pakistan alliance resulted in Islamabad receiving more than
US$7.5 billion worth of direct military assistance and billions of dollars’
worth in arms under the pretext of “fighting” the Soviets (Riedel 2014 ).
Some of these weapons were paid for by Saudi Arabia (Weinbaum and
Khurram 2014 ). The long-term effect of the Saudi involvement in
Afghanistan was felt a decade later in the form of al-Qaida, formed and
headed by Saudi billionaire Osama bin-Laden (Hoodbhoy 2005 ).
The post–Cold War Saudi-US bonhomie that lasted a decade came
under stress due to five significant developments that underscored their
discords. One, the September 11 terror attacks fundamentally transformed
the public opinion in the US and erstwhile indulgence towards Saudi
conservatism gave way to a backlash and sustained campaign against the
Kingdom as well as its brand of Islam. This resulted in the al-Saud charting
a Look East Policy (Gause III 2011 ; Patrick 2016 ) and exploring non-
Western partners (Ottaway 2009 ). Though they were not in a position to
replace the US as the security guarantor, countries like China and India
became attractive options to shore up Saudi wealth in the form of invest-
ments. Greater Saudi political engagement with Asia indeed began after
the September 11 attacks (Al-Tamimi 2014 ; Olimat 2015 ).
Two, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power by the US-led inva-
sion plunged that country into a civil war. The introduction of parliamentary
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR