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Nehru’s search for similar non-aligned, socialist and secular leadership in
the Middle East left him with limited options. If the secular Turkish repub-
lic became a NATO member (Leffler 1985 ), the imperial Iran relied heavily
on the US to keep the Shah in power (Summitt 2004 ; McGlinchey 2013 ).
Amidst the Korean crisis, Israel abandoned its policy of non- identification
and was moving closer to the Western camp. Above all, much of the Arab
world was monarchical, feudal or both.
Under such circumstances, Nehru found an ally in the Free Officers
Movement which overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952. The
emergence of Gamal Abdul Nasser brought hopes for a secular and social-
ist leadership in the region and Nehru got attracted towards the new
Egypt. Ever since their first meeting in February 1953 in Cairo, he treated
Nasser more like a disciple and their camaraderie continued until Nehru’s
death. The Indian prime minister took Nasser with him to the Bandung
conference and introduced him to other leaders, including Chinese Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai. He often made Cairo his transit point during his
visits to Europe and the US and this increased the frequency of Nehru-
Nasser meetings.
Reflecting on this situation Onkar Marwah observed that due to “its
status in the Arab world—and also for its geostrategic location—Egypt
was an obvious choice for Indian attention, especially at a time when sev-
eral Arab countries were being persuaded to enter into military alliance by
the West” (Marwah 1973 , 22). Nehru’s support for Nasser became more
pronounced during the Suez War when he unequivocally endorsed the
Egyptian sovereign rights to nationalize the Suez Canal. The move came
just days after both the leaders met in Brijuni (then known as Brioni),
Yugoslavia, on 19 July but as Nehru informed the Lok Sabha, he was not
privy to Nasser’s move (Nehru 1956 ).
At the time of the Suez crisis, India was one of the prime users of the
Suez Canal and as he was seeking an amicable political solution, the tripar-
tite aggression angered Nehru (Mudiam 1994 , 54–55). More than the
Israeli aggression against its neighbour, he was infuriated by David Ben-
Gurion’s decision to collaborate with the British and French imperialism.
Hence, a couple of weeks after the Israeli invasion, he told the Indian
parliament that “in view of the existing passion” diplomatic exchanges
with Israel was not possible (Lok Sabha 1956, 595) and subsequently
time-is-not-ripe became the standard Indian position vis-à-vis Israel until
the normalization of relations in January 1992.
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR