17arab ColD War anD regional PolitiCs
While Nehru refrained from joining hands with Nasser in the inter-Arab
tension and rivalry (Agwani 1976 ), India’s wider Middle East policy grad-
ually became Cairo-centric. Until the mid-1950s, its ambassador in Cairo
was concurrently accredited to Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. This arrange-
ment due to financial constraints had policy ramifications as Egyptian per-
ceptions vis-à-vis these countries significantly coloured Nehru’s approach
towards them. This was more pronounced on the Arab-Israeli conflict but
less vis-à-vis other countries; for example, during the Yemeni civil war
(1962–70) Saudi Arabia and Egypt were supporting rival Yemeni groups
and the situation was worsened by Nasser’s call for rooting out the conser-
vative monarchies from the Arab lands.
Nehru’s open support to Egypt and personal friendship with Nasser
based on non-alignment came to be viewed by Saudi Arabia and others as an
endorsement of Nasser’s threats against Arab monarchies and considerably
affected India’s fortunes, especially vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. As some observed,
“The close tie with Cairo seemed to hamper New Delhi’s interest in
cultivating other West Asian states more actively” (Heimsath and Mansingh
1971 , 291). This approach “was taken amiss by many an Arab state which
otherwise swore by Arab unity and neutralism” (Agwani 1976 , 72).
The pan-Arabism advocated by Nasser attracted both fellow Arab lead-
ers and Arab masses. Internal upheavals in Syria and Iraq and the consoli-
dation of Ba’athist regimes in both the countries and later-day overthrowing
of the monarchy in Libya in September 1969 were partly influenced by
Nasserism (Ajami 1974 ; Omar 1992 ). The Egyptian leader also enjoyed
considerable popular admiration and support in Arab monarchies such as
Jordan and Saudi Arabia. His regional sway expanded considerably after
the Suez crisis of 1956, when Israel sought to “limit” Nasser’s growing
status in the region (Tal 1996 ).
For a brief period, the al-Sauds were also favourably disposed towards
Egypt and Nasser. Saud who ascended to the throne in November 1953,
upon the death of his father and founder King Ibn-Saud, toyed with the
idea of aligning with pan-Arabism floated by Nasser (Cordesman 2003 ,
107; Bronson 2006 , 69). During his visit to the Kingdom in September
1956, President Nasser received a hero’s welcome, especially in the newly
industrializing town of Dammam in the Eastern Province. Earlier Saudi
Arabia had taken part in the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April
- Israel’s exclusion following an explicit boycott threat from the
THE NEHRU ERA