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get involved in a regime change in the Kingdom (Gerges 1995 ). King
Saud’s preference for lineal succession only complicated the matters and
power struggle ended with the forced abdication of King Saud in November
1964 in favour of his half-brother Faisal.
Thus, since the late 1950s the Saudi-Egyptian differences pulled them
in opposite directions and their simmering differences manifested in their
differing worldview and regional political order. The pan-Arabism under
Nasser evoked considerable anxiety in Arab monarchies over their long-
term stability. The overthrowing of the Hashemites in Iraq, periodic ten-
sion and assassination attempts in Jordan (Dann 1989 , 78–103) and
anti-monarchical rhetoric in the state-controlled Egyptian media (Hudson
1970) unnerved many Arab rulers (Kerr 1965 ). The political union
between Egypt and Syria—United Arab Republic—during 1958–61 and
the Egyptian desire to influence, if not control, events in Sudan (Lefebvre
1993 ) and Yemen (Dawisha 1975 ) raised doubts about Nasser’s long-
term strategy vis-à-vis Arab monarchies. As subsequent events proved, in
trying to fast-forward the nation-building process in the Arab world, the
pan-Arabism sought to impose a supra-regional identity when the post-
Ottoman Arab states were still struggling to evolve distinct territory-based
national identities.
The ideological tussle between republican regimes led by Nasser and
monarchies championed by Saudi Arabia assumed importance in the
wake of the Arab Cold War and growing political struggle between Cairo
and Riyadh for leadership. Despite his serious differences and discords
with rulers in Baghdad and Damascus, Nasser emerged as the principal
champion and leader of pan-Arabism. As a counter measure, some Arab
monarchies sought to forge a common cause based on religion. Ummah
or the community of believers has a stronger historic-theological basis
and pan- Islamism has a greater resonance and acceptance in the Middle
East than the alien and non-Islamic concept of watan or nationalism
based on territorial identity. The former does not recognize the territo-
rial boundaries while the latter was forced to come to terms with the
post-Ottoman Middle Eastern cartography designed and executed by
the colonial powers. Above all, the abolition of the caliphate by Ataturk
in 1924 witnessed some Arab rulers and communities trying to revive
the pan-Islamic institution under their respective leadership (Dawn
1960 ; Al-Rasheed et al. 2015 ).
Thus, both to counter Nasser and to secure legitimacy, some Arab
countries found pan-Islamism as a more attractive counter strategy; for
example, the rulers of Jordan and Morocco trace their lineage to the
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR