23it was a strategic mistake on the part of Nehru and not only complicated
India’s diplomatic options but also limited its foreign policy choices in the
Middle East.
The Indian apprehensions over Pakistan’s moves were compounded by
the latter’s aspirations for an Islamic bloc that would further its interest in
the Middle East. This approach coincided with the Saudi desire for pan-
Islamic politics as a counter-weight to Nasser and his pan-Arabism. This
convergence proved a formidable combination against India, especially
after the formation of World Muslim League in 1962. As Pakistani official
Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, who was the Secretary-General of the OIC
during 1985–88, aptly observed: “The guidelines for Pakistan’s diplomacy
are derived from the Pakistan movement and the concomitant historic
commitment of the Muslims of South Asia to the achievement of the
collective interests of the entire Islamic ummah of which they regard
themselves as integral component” (Pirzada 1987 ).^2
The formation of an Islamic bloc in the form of the OIC had to wait
until after the June War but Pakistan has been pushing its Islamic agenda
since the beginning. Towards this end, since 1947 Pakistan has hosted and
organized many pan-Islamic meetings, conferences and gatherings (Khan
2003 ). The Saudi domestic crisis over the Free Princes in 1960 and some
of them taking refuge in Cairo resulted in Riyadh looking to Pakistani
assistance in bolstering its security capabilities. Though the details are
sketchy, the roots of the Pakistani military presence in the Kingdom can be
traced to mid-1960s, even before the oil boom.
Moreover, the Pakistani leaders were more hostile towards Nasser and
his pan-Arabism than the al-Sauds. The Egyptian disapproval of and opposi-
tion to the CENTO of which Pakistan was a principal member infuriated
the latter. Pakistani leaders did not hide their glee at the military defeat suf-
fered by Nasser during the Suez War. In a private conservation with an
Israeli diplomat at an official reception hosted for visiting Prime Minister
Nehru in Canada, one Pakistani diplomat lamented that but for the British
and French intervention the Israeli army would and should have “gone right
through to Cairo” (Kumaraswamy 2000 , 27). And as discussed elsewhere
(^2) Interestingly, even after the partition of the subcontinent and the formation of a separate
Muslim country in 1947, Pakistani leaders tended to speak ‘on behalf ’ of the Indian Muslims.
This approach has largely contributed to continuing tension between the two neighbours. In
this 1987 statement, the official was also speaking ‘on behalf of Bangladesh’ which had sepa-
rated from Pakistan in 1971.
THE NEHRU ERA