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Amidst the family tussle in the early 1960s, the al-Saud also witnessed
political challenges from Egypt and its leader Nasser. Partly to consolidate
his position vis-à-vis his siblings, Saud sought to befriend Nasser, who was
more than happy to meddle (Wynbrant 2004 , 215–16). By then Egypt
was militarily involved in the Yemen crisis on behalf of the revolutionary
republicans, the anti-monarchical forces led by Abdullah Sallal (Stookey
1978 ). Al-Sauds who shared Nasser’s opposition to military alliances
began to reconsider their position in the light of his growing popularity in
the region and his call for radical changes, including the overthrow of
monarchies (Badeeb 1986 ).
These resulted in Riyadh moving closer to Washington with Saud
granting the US the use of the Dhahran airport as military base (Gresh
2015 , 70). This began a process of growing Saudi identification with the
US and its regional interests, and the erstwhile non-aligned approach
towards great powers gave way to growing proximity with Washington.
Despite their differences over the Palestine issue, the US emerged as
the benefactor of the Kingdom in the politico-military sense. It began
with the permission to develop the first military airfield in Dhahran in
1946 and the formation of the US Military Training Mission in Riyadh
in 1951. During the heydays of the Yemen civil war, the US emerged
as the leading military supplier to Saudi Arabia to counter the threat
from the Egyptian military presence in Yemen. Hence, in 1970 the
US provided nearly US$16 million in military aid to the Kingdom
(Cordesman 2003 ).
Even the sharp differences over the October War of 1973 did not
endure. Though the Kingdom imposed an oil embargo against the US for
its pro- Israeli policies and military support during the War, the oil supplies
were resumed in March 1974, shortly after the disengagement agreement
was signed between Israel and Egypt in January. Subsequently arms-for-oil
became the basis of the US-Saudi relations and were to continue well
beyond the Cold War. Indeed, the Saudi importance for the US got a
boost after the 1979 Islamic revolution in neighbouring Iran which over-
threw the Shah.
Thus, in terms of bloc politics, the Kingdom “is not exactly an ideal
reference point for the study of non-alignment, and non-alignment is
hardly a suitable context if one wants to examine Saudi foreign policy”
(Dhanani 1981 , 361). At the same time, Riyadh did the bare minimum,
which kept it within the NAM but not closer to India. Though not an
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR