48
On the bilateral relations both “expressed satisfaction” at the economic
exchanges and visualized “settling up joint ventures in the field of agricul-
ture, fertilizer and cement.” In its view Mrs. Gandhi’s visit “heralds a new
era” and was an “important step forward” in the bilateral relations and the
communiqué concluded that she had invited King Khalid, Crown Prince
Fahd and Second Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah to visit India (India,
Foreign Affairs Record 1982 , 136). As subsequent events proved, only
Abdullah visited India in January 2006, more than 24 years after Indira
Gandhi’s invitation and as the Saudi monarch. As a follow-up of the visit,
on 22 May 1982 both countries signed their first ever long-term agree-
ment for oil supplies (Asian Recorder 1982 , 16,640).
A cursory reading of the joint communiqué would suggest that the
leaders spent much attention on the political and international issues with
little space for bilateral matters. Out of the 24 paragraphs, only three
talked about improving economic relations, and issues such as oil, expatri-
ates or haj did not figure. One critic went to the extent of observing that
Indira Gandhi’s visit “failed to elevate to a new level the limited political
understanding that has already been established between the two coun-
tries” (Mudiam 1994 , 96). This is especially true when the visit soon faded
away from public memory and the next high-level visit did not happen for
nearly two decades.
Despite these, one cannot ignore the significance of al-Saud taking that
extra step in making Indira Gandhi a special and favoured guest. It was an
earnest effort by both the countries to overcome their prolonged indiffer-
ence. The momentum was partly lost due to Indira Gandhi’s assassination
and subsequently the institutional inertia that India is known for.
concLusion
Though Pakistan has been a dominant factor in India’s external engage-
ments, especially with Saudi Arabia since 1947, it has become more pro-
nounced since the early 1960s. Its military conflict with its neighbour in
1965 and 1971 and the emergence of the OIC resulted in India’s world-
view being a prisoner of the Pakistani syndrome. The political, economic
and strategic support that Pakistan received from al-Saud went against
India’s geostrategic calculations. As Riyadh was consolidating its military-
security partnership with the US, especially after the oil crisis, India was
moving closer to Moscow due to emerging security challenges in its
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR