87the UN and other international forums to denounce Israel and prove to
the Arabs that you are doing more than Pakistan. That way you think you
will impress the Arabs” (Sunday Observer 1982 ). Similar criticisms have
been levelled by the opposition parties, but when there was no relation,
this was a careless and Hassain was declared persona non grata. For the
next six years, Israel was unable to send his successor to its consulate in
Mumbai.
The Indian apprehension over Pakistan, however, was not unfounded.
Despite differences over its excessive flagging of Islam, the Arab-Islamic
Middle East was favourably inclined towards Pakistan. In 1955 the latter
joined Iraq, Iran and the UK to form the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact.
When Iraq left it after the July 1958 military coup, the bloc was renamed
CENTO. The military alliance was part of the post-War US strategy of
containment of Soviet Union, but Pakistan used it to pursue its anti-Indian
policies. Furthermore, in July 1964, Pakistan joined Turkey and Iran to
form the Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD) and this body
survived the Islamic revolution and the end of the Cold War.
At the same time, the US-led anti-Soviet bloc politics placed Pakistan at
odds with some of the prominent players in the Middle East. Not only
Nasser but also King Saud was opposed to the alliance politics. The latter
felt that Israel and its aggressive policies were more severe to regional sta-
bility than the threats posed by the Soviet hegemony. Such a reading of
the bloc politics brought some Arab leaders, especially Nasser, closer to
Nehru’s India which opposed such a Cold War–centric worldview. They
feared that the bloc politics would not only expand the Euro-centric Cold
War into other parts of the world but also divert precious national resources
away from nation-building.
Pakistan, however, was treading a different course and at times even went
against Nasserism. Perceived vulnerability against India was compounded
by the early demise of its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah in September
1948, just over a year after Pakistan’s emergence. This plunged the coun-
try into a spiral of political instability, impeded democratic governance and
eventually led to prolonged military rule. Unlike Republican Turkey,
Pakistan could not benefit from the military rule in terms of institution
building, a process that could have shored up democratic governance in
later years. Thus, its pro-Western orientation was accompanied by a more
conservative approach towards the Middle East. Though it resolutely
opposed recognition of Israel, Pakistani leaders were not enamoured by
PAKISTAN FACTOR