FORGING LINKS BETwEEN REGIONS 87
29 For an overview of the impact that piracy had on ancient markets, see Gabrielsen
2001 : 219–23.
30 The decree also sought to protect merchants by creating a naval force specifically intended
to deal with pirates so ‘that the sea be swept clean’.
31 Xen. Hell. 1.1.36; 5.4.60-61; Dem. 17.20; 18.87–88; 18.301; 50.4–6; IG II^2 408; IG II^2 1628;
Theopomp. FGrHist 115 F 292; Philoch. FGrHist 328 F 162.
32 Diod. Sic. 15.34.3; Xen. Hell. 1.1.36; 5.4.60-61; Dem. 17.20; 18.87–88; 18.301; 50.4–6, 17–20;
IG II^2 408 (= IG II^3 338); IG II^2 1628.
33 For example, in 410 BCE, merchants were charged a 10% tax on their cargo if they sailed
through the zone being patrolled and protected by the Guardians of the Hellespont. Polyb.
4.44.4; IG I^3 61, dated to ca. 420 BCE.
34 Dem. 50.17–21. See Gabrielsen 2001 : 235–6 and Gabrielsen 2003 : 397.
35 Establishing a permanent presence in a region made it easier to disrupt regional piracy and
force it to the fringes of society. A colony situated on a major trade route made it possible to
undertake continuous random spot checks on all shipping within a certain radius. This type
of monitoring was considerably cheaper than a full-scale expedition and could be more
precisely targeted. Ormerod 1924 : 108–9. See also de Souza 1999 : 41.
36 See Gabrielsen 2001 : 233–4.
37 IG II^2 1629.217–231 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003 no. 100.
38 Rhodes and Osborne 2003 : 525 and De Souza 1999 : 38–41; 50–53. IG II^2 1623, lines 276–308
can also be identified as displaying a concern with guarding against piracy.
39 For example, Ormerod 1987: 108–9 argues that one of the primary purposes of the
cleruchies throughout the Athenian empire was to help suppress piracy and banditry.
40 There have been various arguments concerning the precise nature of asylia. Hasebroek
1933 : 128 suggests that it only applied within the granting state’s territory; Michell 1957 : 227
argues that it applied to nationals of the granting city when they went abroad; MacDowell
1978 : 78 suggests it protected the honorands from being seized by Athenians when abroad;
Hopper 1979 : 59 proposes that it offered honorands protection from judicial or military
seizure. See in general Lintott 2004 with references to earlier scholarship.
41 Rigsby 1996 : 1–28; Lintott 2004 : 340–1.
42 Engen 2010 : 185–7.
43 IG I^3 174; IG I^3 98; IG II^2 81 ; IG II^2 286 and 625(= IG II^3 393a and b); IG II^2 360 (= IG
II^3 367).
44 IG II² 12, lines 17–21.
45 IG II^2 360 (= IG II^3 367) = Michell 1957 no. 110; Schwenk 1985 no. 68; Rhodes and
Osborne 2003 no. 95.
46 Engen 2010 : 152–5.
47 Nussbaum 1954 : 6.
48 Hopper 1979 : 113, proposes that the title was purely honorific while Henry 1983 : 130–62
and Herman 1987 : 137–8 believe the award offered both tangible and intangible benefits.
Marek 1984 : 333–81 and Gauthier 1985 : 10, 16 take a slightly different approach, considering
the award in terms of privilege and use rather than honor and function.
49 Culasso Gastaldi 2004 : 6–22. Pollux, for instance, records that proxenoi were obliged to pro-
cure seats and games at festivals for visitors hailing from his adopted city (Poll. 3.59).
50 Hasebroek 1933 : 129; Ténékidès 1965: 540–1; Wallace 1970 : 189–208; Marek 1984 : 359–61;
1985: 67–78.
51 Thuc. 3.52; 5.59; IG II^2 8; Plut. Cim. 16; Xen. Hell. 1.1.35; 6.1; 6.3.3.
52 Ziebarth 1932 –33: 245.
53 Rostovtzeff 1941: 245, 1375 note 74; Burke 1992 : 207.
54 Marek 1984 : 359–61; 1985: 67–78.
55 Rubinstein 2009 : 126–7 suggests that most grants of ateleia awarded in recognition of mil-
itary and political services were honorary in nature whereas those awarded for commercial
services were intended as tax incentives.