The Ancient Greek Economy. Markets, Households and City-States

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34 EDwaRD M. HaRRIs aND DavID M. LEwIs


71 Archaeology magazine, Nov/Dec 2007, pp. 49–52. The agorastikon mentioned in inscriptions
from Mesogaia (SEG 41.75 [262-240/39 BCE]) and Rhamnous (IG ii^2 1245 [c. 251/0 BCE]
lines 8–9) may not be a tax on goods sold in the agora. See Bubelis  2013.
72 Kakavogianni and Anetakis  2012.
73 Pace Möller 2007 :  371:  ‘There is no evidence for further agorai in Attica outside the city
of Athens, Piraeus, and the mining district of Laurion.’ Cf. Osborne 1987 : 108 who makes
a similar claim. For farmers travelling three to four hours to markets, see MacMullen
1970 : 337. Gallant 1991 : 100–1 claims that Ar. Ach. 32–36 proves ‘the absence of exchange
in the Attic village’ but does not cite the evidence of inscriptions (especially the security
horoi – see Harris, Chapter 5 in this volume), and archaeology that suggests the contrary. We
do not know if deme markets met every day or only periodically.
74 Attica may not be normative: Hansen 2006b: 71 points out that ‘while most of the popula-
tion in the small city-states lived in the cities within the walls, most of the population in the
big city-states was settled in the hinterland.’ With a smaller territory and closer proximity to
the city agora, most small and medium-sized poleis may not have developed many country
markets.
75 For a summary, see Reger 2011 : 372–8. See also Eich 2006 : 105–74, who makes a distinction
between local and interregional exchange as well as exchange within the Athenian Empire.
76 See Reger  1994.
77 Reger 1994 : 79, criticizing Polanyi’s view of a ‘world grain market.’ This passage shows that
the price of grain was set by the forces of supply and demand. We do not find convincing
the view of Moreno 2007b: 322 that the elite controlled the grain supply and that grain was
mostly drawn from the ‘surplus product of cleruchies.’ Moreno 2007: 241–2 and passim does
not analyze the economy of Athens in terms of market exchange and misses the integrative
function of markets. For cogent objections to his arguments, see Lytle  2009.
78 See Le Rider 1977 : 407, 439–41; Price 1982 : 181; and Melville-Jones 1978 : 184–7.
79 On wages of hired labourers at Athens, see Loomis  1998.
80 For metics in Athens, see Whitehead  1977.
81 For metics in other Greek cities, see Gauthier 1972 : 107–56.
82 On the mobility of individuals, see the essays in Moatti 2004. On the mobility of
Macedonians, see Tataki  1998.
83 Feyel 2006 : 320–1.
84 Feyel 2006 : 325–8.
85 Feyel 2006 : 346–8.
86 Feyel 2006 : 328.
87 Feyel 2006 : 349.
88 Feyel 2006 : 352. Cf. Reger 1994 : 58–9.
89 For the wages of hired rowers rising in response to an increase in demand, see Xen. Hell.
1.5.4-8.
90 Samama 2003: 25.
91 For Apollonius see Samama 2003:  nos. 165 and 166. For Asclepiades see Samama
2003: no. 341.
92 For Menocritus see Samama 2003: no. 118.
93 North and Thomas 1973. Cf. North 1990 : 121 (‘specialization and division of labour requires
institutions and organizations to safeguard property rights ... so that capital markets as well
as other kinds of exchange can take place with credible commitment on the part of the
players’).
94 North 1981. One can find no discussion of the importance of property rights in promoting
economic growth in Scheidel, Morris and Saller  2007.
95 Reger 1994 : 60.
96 von Reden 2007 : 403.
97 See Pritchett 1953 ; Pritchett and Pippin 1956; Amyx 1958. For an analysis of these house-
holds, see Foxhall 2007 : 21–54.
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