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of pirates would require enormous military effort and huge public expense if
it were to be successful. Consequently, the Athenians sought to curtail piracy
using other, less expensive measures. One such measure was the creation of
alliances that placed responsibility for reducing piratical activity on the allied
states. Two treaties dating to the period between 427 and 424 BCE (between
Athens and Mytilene, and Athens and Halieis) bear witness to this policy: both
demanded that Athens’ allies should make their harbors available to all Athenian
shipping while closing them to known pirates (IG I^3 6 7 ; IG I^3 75). In addition,
each treaty contained a clause forbidding the signatory state from sanctioning
any type of piratical activity (including raiding during times of war). These
treaties represent an attempt to reduce piracy through less expensive political
endeavors rather than military campaigning or colonization. By reducing the
number of safe anchorages available to pirates, the Athenians hoped to make
it more difficult for them to operate. Further evidence for this strategy can
be found in Demosthenes’ Against Theocrines (Dem. 58.56), which refers to a
decree of Moerocles: according to the terms of this agreement, pirates were to
be refused access to all the harbors and ports of Melos.^30 However, the Melians
were either unable or unwilling to enforce these terms, resulting in a fine of
ten talents. The passage seems to suggest that the Athenians encouraged, or
perhaps forced, their allies to accept a mutual pact against piracy: according to
the terms of this pact, each state would be held accountable for suppressing
piracy within its own sphere of influence. If a state were unable to achieve this
objective, they could appeal for Athenian assistance or face heavy fines.
The Athenians also utilized military escorts to ensure that emporoi and naukleroiarrived safely at the Piraeus.^31 This practice began during the Peloponnesian
War but was reintroduced at various times during the fourth century.^32 One
route that was particularly notorious for pirates was that from Phoenicia via
Phaselis to Athens. Although these convoys primarily operated along major
grain supply routes, they were not exclusive to traders in foodstuffs, and thus
merchants transporting other commodities could take advantage. It was even
possible for vessels traveling to destinations other than Athens to join these
convoys.^33 Detailed evidence for the operation of these convoys can be found
in Demosthenes’ oration Against Polycles, in which Apollodorus (son of Pasion)
records that while serving as a trierarch, his main duty was to provide a mil-
itary escort for trading vessels traveling from the Propontis in the northern
Aegean to Athens.^34 This account is supported by IG II^2 1623, lines 276–85
(ca. 336/5 BCE), which records that the strategos Diotimus was sent out to
the Pontus region to provide protection against piratical attacks on merchant
shipping.^35 The importance of keeping watch over Athenian interests around
the Hellespont was stressed on many occasions. For instance, in Demosthenes’
oration Against Theocrines, Epichares publicly accuses several Athenian generals
for failing in this duty: ‘[T] he generals and those in command of your triremes,