SUPPLYING THE ROMAN EMPIRE 111(perhaps twice the true fi gure), and the latter (Josephus, BJ 2.383,386) a
ratio of 2:1 for north African and Egyptian wheat exported to Rome.
Neither passage can bear much weight, and to combine the two is a quite
unacceptable procedure. We place no more credence in the fi gure of 75,000
modii per day that occurs in a third source ( SHA Sept. Sev. 23 cf. 8),
although, as a rate of actual consumption (which is not how the author
presents it), it gives a fi gure of approximately the right order, about 27.5
million modii, over 180,000 tonnes, for the reign of Septimius Severus.
Finally, the actual amount of wheat imported fl uctuated within the range
of around 200,000–400,000 tonnes, 30 to 60 million modii, enough to keep
alive 1^1 / 3 -2^2 / 3 million people, before deductions for grain lost or spoiled. The
interest of the government and the initiative of private traders combined to
ensure that much more grain would come into Rome than that which was
earmarked for the distributions, which fell far short of the requirements of
the population at large. The government appreciated that there was a
shortfall, even if it was not equipped to calculate its size, and was interested
in making it up. The consumption needs of the court, administration and
resident soldiers (around 21,000 men) had to be catered for. Then, families
of three or more on the list of grain receivers, unless represented by more
than one person, had to supplement from other sources a dole suffi cient
only for two people. Augustus showed an awareness of this when he issued
double rations during the shortage that began in AD 6 (Cassius Dio 55.26ff.).
The lowering of the age of eligibility was a more permanent strategy,
followed by Trajan and possibly one or more of his predecessors.^3 Finally,
no emperor could disregard the rest of the population altogether. The
political risks were too great. The whole Roman plebs was a privileged
category.
Roman governments did not operate with the fi gures cited above, with
the exception of the grain for the dole. They might, however, have had rough
import targets. Perhaps not Augustus. His record suggests a lack of system
and a dangerous degree of improvisation. Crises were resolved, not always
very fast, rather than averted (cf. Cassius Dio 55.33ff.; Res Gestae 15). It
looks as if he did not always have adequate reserve stocks available, but was
able to produce grain in emergencies by putting pressure on private grain
holders and distributors. He did, however, bequeath to his successors a
permanent offi ce headed by a prefect of the grain supply ( praefectus
annonae ).^4 There are signs that the more responsible post-Augustan
emperors were interested in introducing more order and regularity into the
supply system than Augustus was able to achieve. Tiberius on one occasion
dismissed contemptuously talk of crisis, pronouncing himself satisfi ed that
he had succeeded in increasing the fl ow of grain from the provinces (Tacitus,
Ann. 6.13). In Tacitus’ report of the incident Tiberius does not say how this
was achieved, but it is likely that in his measures he was anticipating
Claudius’ panicky drive to add to the number of regular, bulk suppliers. This
policy, extended no doubt by later emperors, and combined with an increase