have had personal aspirations that were at odds with those of regional
administrators, and therefore tried to intervene in political relations, as
he appears to have tried with the ambassadors from Parion that were on
their way to Medokos with suitable presents (Anab. 7.3.16); but that does
not equate with Seuthes’own policy. Xenophon, writing several decades
after these events, was justifying his own conduct towards his peers, and
responding to various criticisms that had evidently been made of his own
behaviour and remuneration at the time. Much of the content of these
books of theAnabasisconsists of retrospective glosses on what was said
and done, so as to show his own behaviour in a positive light. Seuthes’
actions are thus given a less favourable spin.^76 The ambiguous profile of
Seuthes in theAnabasisis different from the Seuthes of the same author’s
Hellenika, where he cooperated in 398 and 397bcwith the Spartan
Derkylidas, operatingfirst in Bithynia, then in the Chersonese, where the
Spartan commander was following up the work of his predecessor in the
area, Klearchos, who had launched a military campaign against unnamed
Thracians in the area of the Propontis during his period as garrison
commander at Byzantion (Hell.3.2.2–5, 2.8–10; Diod. 14.38.6–7).
Diplomacy and power relationsThese operations, on either side of the Hellespontine Straits, show events
in which authorities from different cultural backgrounds, and with
different political affiliations, cooperated closely in terms of regional
policies. The action that took place in and around the Straits in the
final years of thefifth and the beginning of the fourth centurybc
happened to be connected with the momentous events in thefinal
years of the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath. As a result, the
personalities and circumstances have acquired a little more colour and
substance than formal agreements, decrees, or treaties usually provide. In
this series of events Odrysian kings and princes were cooperating with
Spartan commanders; elsewhere, and more usually, they were cooper-
ating with Athenian officials, symptomatic of a long-term policy that is
reflected in a series of honorary inscriptions for Odrysian rulers from
Athens. These long-term policies of cooperation, however circumscribed
refs n.150 on the alleged breakdown of central authority (notably Tacheva 1988); see also
Tacheva 1997, 97–149.(^76) Xen.Anab. 7. 5.16, 7.1–56 (Seuthes is presented in a distinctly ambiguous light, so as
to enhance Xenophon’s success infinally extracting the pay due to the mercenaries); Stronk
1995, 250–72, esp. 262–81.
Societies and economies 115